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ABSTRACT
Although cognitive theories suggest that attentional bias to illness 
stimuli and inflation of subjective risk of future negative health 
events are etiologically related to hypochondriacal concern, little 
eirpirical research has been conducted on these cognitive distortions. 
The present study investigated attentional bias, as inferred from RTs 
on an attentional search information processing paradigm, and 
subjective risk, as measured by probability judgments of future 
health events, in 200 medical outpatients differing in level of 
hypochondriacal concern. It was hypothesized that hypochondriacal 
concern would be associated with specific cognitive biases for 
illness-related, as opposed to socially threatening, stimuli. It was 
also hypothesized that dysphoric mood would interact with the 
cognitive distortions in the prediction of hypochondriacal concern.
An exploratory path analysis also tested the proposed causal 
contributions of objective health status, minor life events, 
depressed mood, attentional bias, and subjective risk in the 
production of hypochondriacal concern. The results indicated, 
however, that attentional bias to socially threatening stimuli 
accounted for more variance in hypochondriacal concern than illness 
cues. Also unexpected was the finding that subjects tended to rate 
future positive health events as more likely to occur than negative 
health events as hypochondriacal concern increased in the sample. 
Although the results generally failed to support the hypothesis that 
illness-specific cognitive distortions are related to hypochondriacal
vii
concern, several factors which may have contributed to the negative 
findings were identified. Further investigations of cognitive 




Hypochondriasis is one of the most poorly understood and 
inadequately researched phenomena in psychology (Turner, Jacob, & 
Morrison, 1984). Much of what has been written about hypochondriasis 
has been based upon clinical observations or assumptions, rather than 
on experimental evidence. Various theories have invoked factors 
ranging from unconscious, intrapsychic conflicts (Hyler & Sussman, 
1984) to heightened perceptual sensitivity (Hanback & Revelle, 1978). 
Recently, however, cognitive theories have been proposed to account 
for the origin and maintenance of hypochondriacal concern (e.g., 
Barsky & Klerman, 1983; Warwick, 1989; Warwick & Salkovskis, 1990). 
Such approaches would seem well suited to explaining hypochondriasis, 
the primary diagnostic features of which include preoccupations, 
false beliefs, irrational fears and misinterpretations.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of cognitive 
factors in the etiology of hypochondriasis. A historical review, 
clinical description, prevalence rates, and sociodemographic factors 
of hypochondriasis will be presented first. The assessment 
techniques utilized with hypochondriasis will also be explored. 
Following this will be a review of the major etiological theories of 
hypochondriasis and a rationale for the investigation of cognitive 
factors in hypochondriasis. Information will then be presented 
regarding cognitive factors in emotional disorders and their 
assessment with objective, information processing strategies. At the 
conclusion of this paper, a study examining attentional bias and 
subjective risk in individuals differing in levels of hypochondriacal
concern is presented. The study also addresses the interaction of 
stressful life events and mood with hypochondriacal concern, as well 
as the specificity of cognitive distortions as they relate to 
physically threatening information. The results of the study, as 
well as implications for future research, are discussed.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Historical Views of Hypochondriasis
The term "hypochondriasis" was coined by Galen in the 2nd 
century A.D. to describe a form of melancholia and is derived from 
Greek words which refer to the upper abdominal area (Turner, Jacob, & 
Morrison, 1984). Later in the 17t.h and 18th centuries, the word was 
applied to suspected organic pathology of the "hypochondriacal 
organs", such as the stomach, liver, and spleen (Hyler & Sussman, 
1984). Over time, hypochondriasis was increasingly used as a 
fashionable explanation for a variety of ills. Hypochondriasis 
gradually became associated with hysteria, with the former term being 
applied mostly to men, while the later was diagnosed more frequently 
in women (Turner et al., 1984). With continued indiscriminate 
diagnostic usage, it was eventually abandoned as a disease concept 
and was increasingly used by clinicians as a pejorative label for 
difficult patients (Turner et al., 1984). During the late 19th 
century, the term evolved into its present usage as a description of 
a psychiatric condition characterized by a fear of and preoccupation 
with imagined disease (Kenyon, 1976).
Around the turn of the century, Freud introduced his formulation 
of hypochondriacal neurosis. He postulated that hypochondriasis was 
a drive derivative produced by a disturbance of libido discharge 
(Hyler & Sussman, 1984). Later psychoanalytic theories 
conceptualized hypochondriasis as transformed aggression (e.g., Brown 
& Valliant, 1981) and also as a defense mechanism (e.g., McCranie, 
1979). According to Hyler and Sussman (1984), the most popular
psychodynamic formulation of the disorder suggests that 
hypochondriasis develops in order to fulfill unmet dependency needs. 
In their review, Barsky and Klerman (1983) concluded that the various 
psychodynamic conceptualizations of hypochondriasis are based on 
impressionistic, anecdotal, and uncontrolled evidence.
Clinical Description and Diagnosis of Hypochondriasis
Hypochondriasis was not even listed in the first diagnostic 
manual of the American Psychiatric Association (APA, 1952) but 
appeared in the second manual (APA, 1968) as a form of neurosis 
(Turner et al., 1984). The diagnostic criteria for the disorder, 
however, were vague and heavily influenced by Freudian concepts. A 
major change occurred in the third edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III; APA, 1980) when 
hypochondriasis was listed as an independent, syndrome categorized 
with the newly formed section of somatoform disorders.
Current diagnostic criteria for hypochondriasis in the revised 
third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (APA, 1987) include:
1) preoccupation with the fear of having, or the belief that 
one has, a serious disease, based on the person's interpretation 
of physical signs or sensations as evidence of physical illness;
2) appropriate physical evaluation does not support the 
diagnosis of any physical signs or sensations or the person's 
unwarranted interpretation of them, and the symptoms ... are not 
just symptoms of panic attacks; and 3) the fear of having, or 
belief that one has, a disease persists despite medical 
reassurance; ... but 4) the belief is not of delusional 
intensity, (p. 261)
Associated features include strained doctor-patient relationships and 
"doctor-shopping". A duration of at least six months is required for 
the diagnosis (APA, 1987).
Diagnostic Validity of Hypochondriasis
In spite of its adoption into the diagnostic nomenclature, 
debate has continued over whether hypochondriasis is a discrete 
diagnostic entity or a symptom (Barsky & Klerman, 1983). After 
reviewing the literature and case records of 512 patients given a 
chart diagnosis of hypochondriasis, Kenyon (1964) concluded that 
hypochondriasis does not exist as a primary state. Critics of the 
DSM classification system (e.g., Barsky & Klerman, 1983) point out 
that the somatization of hypochondriasis (i.e., the expression of 
emotional discomfort and psychosocial stress in the physical language 
of bodily symptoms) can occur secondary to other conditions, such as 
anxiety disorders and schizophrenia.
For example, several authors (e.g., Brink, 1982; DeAlcaron,
1964) have reported that hypochondriasis is most likely to occur as a 
result of depression in the elderly, noting the frequent clinical 
reports of hypochondriacal concern in aged medical patients. In 
their review of the literature, however, Costa and McCrae (1985) 
noted that reports of increased hypochondriacal concern in the elderly 
are confounded by real health changes with age. They concluded that 
the stereotype of the elderly hypochondriac is unfounded. More 
recently, hypochondriasis has been implicated as an associated 
feature in panic disorder (Noyes, Reich, Clancy, & O'Gorman, 1986) 
and agoraphobia (Fava, Kellner, Zielezny, & Grandi, 1988).
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Uncontrolled studies by these research groups suggest that when the 
underlying "true" disorder (e.g., panic) was treated, the 
hypochondriacal attitudes diminished even though these concerns were 
not specifically targeted by treatment.
Other authors, however, feel that hypochondriasis in its primary 
form is a valid diagnostic category. For example, Kellner and his 
associates (1987) compared attitudes of DSM-III diagnosed 
hypochondriacs to matched family practice patients, nonpatient 
employees, and non-hypochondriacal psychiatric patients. Results 
supported the existence of a discrete syndrome, consistent with the 
DSM-III conceptualization of hypochondriasis. Barsky, Wyshak, and 
Klerman (1986) report considerable consistency and internal validity 
for the diagnosis of hypochondriasis. Appleby (1987) argues that 
viewing hypochondriacal symptoms as "masks" of other psychiatric 
disorders ignores evidence that supports the validity of this 
diagnostic entity. Moreover, clinical anecdotes and uncontrolled 
studies suggest that a substantial proportion of these patients 
recover or improve with techniques that specifically target primary 
hypochondriacal concerns and behaviors (Kellner, 1986).
Salkovskis and Warwick (1986) suggest that hypochondriacal 
concerns run along a continuum from the mild transient concerns over 
unusual bodily sensations to the excessive preoccupation found in 
some individuals whose thought and activity are centered around 
illness. Therefore, hypochondriasis may exist as a valid diagnostic 
entity in cases of extreme hypochondriacal concern. In addition, 
hypochondriacal concerns of varying degrees may appear in
individuals with other psychiatric diagnoses, as well as in the 
normal public. For example, mild, transient hypochondriacal concerns 
are often found in beginning medical students, patients recovering 
from acute and life-threatening illness, and individuals who have 
recently lost a family member to a disease (Barsky & Klerman, 1983). 
Prevalence and Sociodemographic Variables Associated with 
Hypochondriasis
As Kellner (1985) notes, functional somatic symptoms are 
ubiquitous in the general population. About 60-80% of the public 
will experience at least one somatic symptom in any one week 
(Pennebaker, 1982). Various reports suggest that between 20 and 84% 
of medical outpatients complain of somatic symptoms for which no 
organic cause can be found (Kellner, 1986). Excessive symptom 
reporting and overutilization of medical services may reflect either 
hypochondriacal concerns, or one of a number of other poorly 
understood conditions, such as somatization and conversion disorder 
(Warwick, 1989). It has been estimated that patients with excessive 
health anxiety are responsible for 50% of the cost of adult 
ambulatory general health care (Barsky & Klerman, 1983).
A methodologically adequate diagnostic survey of the prevalence 
of hypochondriasis in a representative sample of the general 
population has yet to be conducted (Kellner, 1986). Examination of 
the reported prevalence of the diagnosis of hypochondriasis among 
psychiatric patients, however, has yielded estimates ranging from 0 
to 12.5 percent (Kellner, 1986). In the most rigorously derived 
study published to date (Barsky, Wyshak, Klerman, & Latham, 1990),
the six-month prevalence rate of DSM-III-R diagnosed hypochondriasis 
among medical outpatients was estimated to be between 4.2% and 6.3% 
of consecutive attenders at a general medical clinic.
One of the biggest controversies in hypochondriasis research has 
centered on age distribution of the disorder. While several early 
studies (e.g., Brink, 1982) suggested that hypochondriasis is 
primarily a disorder of the elderly, Costa and McCrae (1985) 
concluded in their review that hypochondriacal complaints are stable 
across the age span. Similarly, Kellner (1986) suggests that with 
the possible exception of the depressed elderly, findings on the 
relation between hypochondriasis and age are inconclusive.
Reports of the gender distribution of hypochondriasis also lack 
consensus. Although the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) states that the 
disorder is equally common in both sexes, clinical lore suggests that 
hypochondriasis is diagnosed more frequently in women than in men 
(Hyler & Sussman, 1984). Some studies (e.g., Kenyon, 1976), however,
have actually found the disorder to be more prevalent in males. No
significant differences emerge between the sexes in the prevalence of 
self-reported hypochondriacal concerns in normal subjects (Kellner,
1986). In the previously cited study of prevalence rates in medical 
outpatients (Barsky et al., 1990), female hypochondriacs outnumbered 
their male counterparts by 3:1, but the ratio did not differ
significantly from that of the clinic population as a whole.
Furthermore, no sex differences were found in reported 
hypochondriacal symptomatology. When compared to a control group, 
the hypochondriacal patients did not differ significantly in any
sociodemographic risk factors except that they were significantly 
more likely to be black. This finding supports numerous cross- 
cultural studies which suggests wide variations in specific 
hypochondriacal complaints and attitudes across ethnic groups and 
countries (Barsky & Klerman, 1983; Turner et al., 1984).
Assessment of Hypochondriasis
The assessment of hypochondriasis has relied mainly on the use 
of questionnaires. The Illness Attitude Scales (Kellner, 1986) and 
the Whitely Index (Pilowsky, 1967) are self-report instruments that 
focus on hypochondriacal attitudes and beliefs rather than on reports 
of somatic symptoms. Principal components analysis or factor 
analysis of such measures typically yield multiple factors such as 
disease phobia, disease conviction, and bodily preoccupations 
(Kellner, 1986). Such questionnaires have demonstrated adequate 
reliability and validity, and are effective in discriminating between 
psychiatric patients diagnosed as hypochondriacal and those who are 
not (Barsky & Wyshak, 1989). Kellner (1986) cautions, however, that 
the use of such scales can yield misleading results in patients who 
have a serious physical disease.
The Hs clinical scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (McKinley & Hathaway, 1940) was originally developed to 
identify individuals who manifest a pattern of symptoms associated 
with the label of hypochondriasis (Graham, 1987). Although the 33- 
items in the scale assess vague somatic complaints, it is not a pure 
measure of hypochondriasis (Kellner, 1986). Patients with organic 
diseases, other somatoform disorders, anxiety, and depression also
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tend to score high on the scale (Graham, 1987). Several other 
inventories exist which measure self-reported somatic symptoms (e.g., 
Wahler Physical Symptoms Inventory; Wahler, 1983) or abnormal illness 
behavior (e.g., Illness Behavior Inventory; Turkat & Pettegrew,
1983 ). Although these measures appear to be correlated with 
hypochondriacal attitudes, they do not directly assess the purported 
cognitive distortions of hypochondriacal beliefs and attitudes which 
constitute the disorder's primary diagnostic criteria.
Questionnaires which rely upon self-reports of physical symptoms 
or illness behavior are confounded with the behavioral and somatic 
effects of organic illness, and add little to the understanding of 
hypochondriasis (Mabe, Hobson, Jones, & Jarvis, 1988). Such measures 
would be unlikely to effectively discriminate between hypochondriasis 
and other somatoform disorders or organic disease. Therefore, self- 
reports of physical symptoms or illness behavior provide only half of 
the story of hypochondriasis (Costa & McCrae, 1985). According to 
Mabe and his associates (1988), studies of hypochondriasis in medical 
populations have generally been flawed because of insufficient 
attention to objective health status. Costa and McCrae (1985) 
concur, arguing that the diagnosis of hypochondriasis depends upon 
the discrepancy between subjective and objective health. Excessive 
symptom complaints or overutilization of medical services cannot be 
equated with hypochondriasis in the absence of objective medical 
information (Zonderman, Heft, & Costa, 1985).
Two of the most methodologically adequate studies of 
hypochondriasis published to date have included objective ratings of
patient health status. In a study of medical inpatients, a composite 
index of hypochondriacal traits was created from the Whitely Index 
(Pilowsky, 1967), the discrepancy between the subject's and 
physician's ratings of the severity of subject's illness, and the 
physician's ratings of the extent to which the presentation of the 
subject's illness was disproportionate to demonstrable disease (Mabe 
et al., 1988). Correlations between the Discrepancy Score, Physician 
Ratings, and the Whitely Index, however, were insignificant. The 
physician ratings were based upon a single interview; ratings 
supplemented with a chart review could possibly have increased 
reliability. In a study of general medical outpatients, Barsky, 
Wyshak, and Klerman (1986) conducted an audit of medical records and 
diagnoses were judged by predetermined criteria as to the severity of 
illness. The number of major and minor medical diagnoses were not 
correlated with self-reported hypochondriacal attitudes in 
hypochondriacal patients. Strategies such as these which rule out 
severe organic illness and provide objective evidence of the 
discrepancy between patients' fears and disease status may provide 
the most valid assessment of hypochondriasis (Mabe et al., 1988). 
Contemporary Etiological Theories of Hypochondriasis
In the 50s and 60s, Parsons (1951 ) and Mechanic and Volkart 
(1960, 1961) revolutionized the way illness and somatization could be 
conceptualized with the introduction of such concepts as illness 
behavior, the sick role, and symptom reporting. Pilowsky (1967) 
applied these ideas to hypochondriacs and reframed them as abnormal 
illness behaviors, noting the discrepancy between the nature and
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degree of hypochondriacs1 claim to the sick role and their lack of 
organic pathology. This formulation of hypochondriasis suggested 
that social learning factors such as parental modeling and 
reinforcement of illness behaviors were primary etiological agents 
(Mechanic, 1972). This conceptualization provided an objective 
description of the syndrome that was more empirically-based than 
psychodynamic models. While popular, this model raised as many 
questions as it answered and prompted a search for important 
moderating variables within illness behavior.
Physiological disturbance is another factor that has been 
explored in hypochondriasis. Nemiah (1977) has proposed that 
hypochondriacal and psychosomatic patients may suffer from 
alexithymia, a neurophysiological inability to experience emotion, 
but no such deficit has been experimentally confirmed (Warwick & 
Salkovskis, 1990). A wide body of research does suggest, however, 
that individual differences exist in the visceral or perceptual 
experience of kinesthetic, visual, auditory, somatosensory, and pain 
stimuli (Barsky, Wyshak, & Klerman, 1990). Therefore, some 
researchers have proposed psychophysiological explanations for 
hypochondriasis, suggesting that heightened perceptual sensitivity or 
reduced pain thresholds are responsible for the disorder (Kellner, 
1986).
The few empirical studies conducted with hypochondriacal 
subjects are supportive of this theory. For example, patients with 
disease conviction and disease phobia have been found to have lower 
thresholds for and tolerance to experimental pain (Bianchi, 1971;
Merskey & Evans, 1975). Similarly, Petrie (1978) has documented that 
hypochondriacal normals exhibit a lower tolerance for experimental 
pain, as well as kinesthetic amplification (i.e., overestimation of 
the size of objects held in hands while blindfolded). Hanback and 
Revelle (1978) demonstrated that hypochondriacal normals are more 
visually sensitive to dual flicker fusion of light. Several studies 
also suggest that hypochondriacs are more sensitive to or reactive to 
normal physiological sensations (Barsky & Wyshak, 1990). For 
example, hypochondriacal out-patients were more accurate in 
estimations of cardiac function than phobic patients (Tyrer, Lee, & 
Alexander, 1980). Wright, Kane, Olsen, and Smith (1977) found that 
hypochondriacal subjects report respiratory symptoms disproportionate 
to the results of pulmonary function tests.
In this conceptualization of hypochondriasis, the clinical 
characteristics of bodily preoccupation, disease conviction, and 
doctor-shopping are caused by heightened perceptual sensitivity. 
Equally plausible is that increased attention to bodily sensations 
heightens perceptual sensitivity (Barsky & Klerman, 1983; Pennebaker, 
1982). While the studies cited above are suggestive, they are 
ultimately flawed because subjects in each of the experiments were 
aware of the experimental condition, or were asked to focus their 
attention upon physical sensations. The proof that hypochondriasis 
is caused by heightened perceptual sensitivity can only be provided 
by an experiment in which internal sensations are directly 
manipulated without subjects' knowledge. None exist in the
14
literature, reflecting the methodological and ethical difficulties 
that would be involved in such an experiment.
Barsky and Klerman (1983) suggest that the key feature of the 
disorder involves the abnormal amplification or augmentation of 
normal bodily sensations by selective attention to or the 
misinterpretation of innocuous physical sensations. For example, the 
symptoms so frequently complained about by hypochondriacs are those 
that commonly occur with stress (Kenyon, 1964; Mechanic, 1972) and/or 
have a very high prevalence in the general population (Kellner,
1986). Factors that may be involved in the amplification of normal 
bodily symptoms include anxiety (Barsky & Klerman, 1983), 
conditioning, or social learning (Kellner, 1986). Pennebaker (1982) 
has also demonstrated that simply directing a person's attention to 
bodily sensations increases reports of physical symptoms. Selective 
attention to the "internal", physical environment may thus augment or 
amplify bodily sensations and produce hypochondriacal concerns 
(Barsky & Klerman, 1983). Pennebaker (1982) also suggests that 
hypochondriacs also search for and attend to illness-related stimuli 
in the external environment (e.g., health columns in the newspapers).
Barsky and Klerman (1983) have therefore concluded that 
hypochondriasis is best conceptualized as a cognitive abnormality in 
that patients: 1 ) incorrectly assess and misat.tribute the somatic 
symptoms of emotional arousal and of normal bodily function and 2) 
consistently think and perceive in physical and concrete terms rather 
in emotional and subjective terms. Warwick (1989) has elaborated 
upon this idea in a cognitive-behavioral theory of hypochondriasis.
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She proposes the initial stage of the disorder is characterized by 
the perception of an intrusive, health-related stimulus such as a 
physical sensation. The stimulus may be erroneously appraised as 
threatening if the individual holds inaccurate health beliefs or has 
past personal experience of medical mismanagement. Negative thoughts 
and images of a threat to health will be associated with anxiety, 
which in turn may be associated with increased physiological arousal 
and attentional focus on bodily sensations. These may then be 
interpreted by the patient as further evidence of illness. A range 
of avoidant behaviors, bodily checking, and reassurance seeking may 
serve as maintaining factors until a vicious circle is established, 
resulting in preoccupation with physical symptoms and health 
(Warwick, 1989).
Stress and Hypochondriasis
While stress has been implicated in symptom-reporting among 
normals (e.g., Banks & Gannon, 1988), theory and research suggest 
that there is a special interaction between emotional distress and 
abnormal illness fears. Psychodynamic theories and clinical lore 
suggests that these patients repress or deny emotional distress 
(Hyler & Sussman, 1984). Cognitive-behavioral theories suggest that 
hypochondriacs misinterpret the somatic manifestations of emotional 
arousal or stress as signs of illness (e.g., Barsky & Klerman, 1983). 
Research has documented the adoption of the sick role (e.g., Mechanic 
& Volkart, 1961), and the overutilization of medical services in 
somatizers (e.g., Miranda, Perez-Stable, Munoz, Hargreaves, & Henke,
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1991) under stress. Thus, both clinical lore and research suggest 
that hypochondriacal concerns intensify during periods of stress.
Seminal formulations of stress in the social sciences (e.g., 
Holmes & Rahe, 1967) attempted to quantify major life events such as 
divorce or job change. Although stress is presumed to be a factor in 
symptom complaints and the initiation and maintenance of illness, the 
relation has often been obscured by difficulties in temporally 
linking major life events to the onset and expression of symptoms 
(Brantley & Jones, 1989). More recently, the concept of stress has 
been expanded to include minor stress or "hassles" (Brantley, 
Waggoner, Jones, & Rappaport, 1987; DeLongis, Coyne, Dakof, Folkman,
& Lazarus, 1982; Kanner, Coyne, Schaeffer, & Lazarus, 1981).
Examples of minor stress include such things as being interrupted 
while relaxing or being late to an appointment. The temporal 
relation to physical symptoms is more easily ascertained for recent, 
minor stressors than for global, retrospectively recalled major life 
events. More importantly, however, minor stress appears to account 
for more of the variance in symptom-reporting than major life events 
(e.g., Brantley & Jones, 1989) and contributes information 
independently of what can be attributed to major life events in the 
stress-illness relation (DeLongis et al., 1982).
Research suggests that two important factors, the global number 
of stressors and the perceived impact of the stressors (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984), contribute to the stress response. Although theories 
and clinical lore imply that hypochondriacs repress or deny emotion 
and experience stress somatically, little research has been conducted
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which examines their patterns of endorsement of these two aspects of 
minor life events. Somatizers, for example, may endorse frequency 
levels of minor stressors similar to normals, but rate their impact 
as being relatively more negative.
Support for a Cognitive Theory of Hypochondriasis
Interest in the relation between emotion and cognition has 
dramatically increased over the last decade. Cognitive distortions 
have been hypothesized to either directly contribute to or act as a 
moderating variable in the etiology and maintenance of disorders such 
as anxiety and depression. In addition, cognitive-based treatments 
have formed the basis of successful interventions for emotional 
disturbances (e.g., Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). Since 
cognitive approaches have been successful with what have been 
traditionally termed as disorders of mood, such an approach would 
seem especially suited to a disorder like hypochondriasis, whose 
primary diagnostic features emphasize cognitive excesses and 
distortions such as preoccupations, false beliefs, irrational fears, 
and misinterpretations. Indeed, the most widely used interventions 
for hypochondriasis recommend the use of either "common-sense" based 
reassurances to allay irrational fears, or cognitive/cognitive- 
behavioral strategies to more vigorously attack distorted beliefs 
(e.g., Barsky, Geringer, & Wool, 1988; Kellner, 1986).
Several investigators have used questionnaires (e.g., Kellner & 
Schneider-Braus, 1988) and factor analysis (e.g., Pilowsky, 1967; 
Bianchi, 1973) to examine the beliefs and attitudes of 
hypochondriacal subjects and compare their responses to other
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clinical populations and normals. The results of these studies 
suggest that hypochondriacs think about and perceive illness 
differently from other people. For example, Kellner and his 
associates (1987) found that hypochondriacal patients report more 
fears of and false beliefs about disease, greater attention to bodily 
sensations, more fears about death, and greater utilization of 
medical care than general medical patients or normal controls. Their 
hypochondriacal subjects also reported greater distrust of their 
physicians and more health-risk behaviors. Barsky and Wyshak (1989) 
have documented that hypochondriasis is positively related to several 
health-related attitudes and concerns, such as amplification of 
bodily sensations, fears of aging and death, and a sense of bodily 
vulnerability.
While supportive of cognitive theories of hypochondriasis, 
questionnaire studies such as these provide only a descriptive 
account of self-reported beliefs and attitudes. It remains unclear 
whether the purported interpretive and attentional biases in 
hypochondriasis actually exist (Hitchcock & Mathews, 1992). As has 
been extensively argued elsewhere (e.g., Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1988), self-reported differences in beliefs and attitudes 
cannot be taken as unequivocal evidence of the underlying cognitive 
processes. Such reports may reflect demand effects, or "common- 
sense" theories developed in retrospect to explain behavior or 
feelings. Subjects may in fact have very limited access to, or 
direct knowledge of, attentional and interpretive processes as they 
occur, especially if they are overlearned and automatic in nature,
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rather than intentional and consciously controlled (Williams et al.,
1988).
Furthermore, cognitive theories of hypochondriasis (Barsky & 
Klerman, 1983; Warwick, 1989) imply that hypochondriacs have 
specific attentional and interpretive biases toward physically- 
threatening information only. Questionnaire studies of 
hypochondriasis have typically failed to assess self-reported 
cognitive distortions in other domains, such as social threat. 
Complete understanding of this disorder may require the assessment of 
cognitive factors using objective, information processing tasks, and 
comparisons of the processing of illness related-cues to threatening 
information from other domains.
In the only study to date to employ objective assessment of 
cognitive distortions in hypochondriasis, Hitchcock and Mathews 
(1992) examined the interpretation of ambiguous bodily sensations in 
three experiments using separate samples of nonclinical subjects 
differing in level of hypochondriacal concern. In the first task, 
subjects directly reported their thoughts and interpretations about 
ambiguous bodily symptoms. The results suggested clear evidence of 
interpretive bias in the expected direction, in which subjects with 
high levels of hypochondriacal concern reported more catastrophic 
illness interpretations of ambiguous bodily sensations than subjects 
with low levels of hypochondriacal concern. The presence of an 
interpretive bias found further, conditional support in a task 
designed to be less demand-prone and transparent than self-report. 
Although individuals with high levels of hypochondriacal concern were
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found to endorse significantly more threatening versions of 
previously heard ambiguous sentences than subjects with lower levels 
of hypochondriacal concerns, the high hypochondriacal subjects were 
equally likely to endorse physically and socially threatening 
versions.
In the final task, subjects were presented with sentences, some 
of which implied social or illness threats, and then asked to make a 
speeded decision about whether a word describing the inference had 
appeared in the sentence. The results from this task failed to 
support the hypothesis of an automatic inference bias. Overall, the 
results of these three studies (Hitchcock & Mathews, 1992) confirmed 
the existence of an interpretive bias toward threatening information, 
but cast doubt on the idea that this bias is always specific to 
illness cues, or that the interpretive process is completely 
automatic. Interestingly, the third study did indicate that subjects 
with high hypochondriacal concern were quicker to identify previously 
exposed illness words, suggesting a specific, enhanced sensitivity to 
illness-related information in hypochondriasis. Thus, it may be that 
selective attention to illness cues plays a role in the initiation or 
maintenance of hypochondriacal concern with bodily symptoms. 
Attentional Bias
Selective attention, the differential processing of simultaneous 
sources of information, is the natural consequence of capacity 
limitations within the cognitive system (Williams et al., 1988). A 
number of studies suggest that this process may be biased in 
emotional disorders such that clinically anxious individuals
selectively attend to threatening information (e.g., Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1985). Increased perceptual salience for such material has 
been found to differentially affect the performance of clinically 
anxious patients, as compared to normals, on a variety of 
information-processing tasks (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). For 
example, the incidental presence of threatening stimuli has been 
found to influence the direction of attentional responses and to 
interfere with performance on ongoing tasks in anxious individuals 
(Mogg, Mathews, Bird, & Macgregor-Morris, 1990). While clinically 
anxious subjects appear to consistently shift attention toward 
threatening stimuli, non-anxious normals appear to shift attention 
away from such material (Williams et al., 1988).
Several lines of research suggest that a strong association 
exists between internally-focused attention and increased symptom 
reporting (for a review, see Cioffi, 1991). These include studies of 
self-awareness (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981), deficits in the 
external environment (e.g., Pennebaker, 1982), and pain distraction 
(e.g., Mullen & Suls, 1982). A hypochondriacal response is presumed 
by many (e.g., Barsky & Klerman, 1983) to reflect the selective 
deployment of attention to internal, physical sensations, as well as 
to illness-relevant cues in the external world, such as media reports 
of specific diseases. As noted previously, Hitchcock and Mathews 
(1992) have found evidence of increased salience for illness-related 
information in individuals with high hypochondriacal concern. This 
finding suggests the possibility that hypochondriacal subjects show 
an attentional bias similar to that found in anxiety patients, but
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which is more specifically focused on illness cues. If so, then such 
an attentional focus could arise because of fears of illness, but 
could also enhance the perception and interpretation of symptoms, 
thus causing an increase in fear.
Bower's (1981) network model suggests that selective attention 
may be biased toward the encoding of mood-congruent material and that 
this bias should lead to increased perceptual salience for such 
material. Selective attention to threat cues in trait-anxious 
individuals appears to increase during manipulations of state anxiety 
or experimentally-induced stress (Williams et al., 1988). Broadbent 
and Broadbent (1988) suggest that this interaction between trait and 
state anxiety is a reliable effect. A similar interaction may occur 
in hypochondriacal patients such that attentional bias to illness- 
related threat cues may be potentiated during times of stress or 
dysphoric mood.
Experimental Methods. Several different information processing 
paradigms have been adapted for investigations of attentional bias in 
emotional disorders. The three most frequently used involve 
variations of the Stroop color-naming task (Stroop, 1935), the dot 
probe (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tat.a, 1986), and the attentional search 
task (Broadbent, Broadbent, & Jones, 1986). As utilized for 
investigations of attentional bias in anxiety, the Stroop color- 
naming task presents threatening and neutral words in varying colors 
and asks subjects to name the ink color of the words as quickly as 
possible while ignoring the meaning of the words. Slower color- 
naming in the presence of threatening, as opposed to neutral, words
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suggests an attentional bias to threatening stimuli. In the dot 
probe experiment, word pairs are presented on a computer screen. The 
subjects' task is to read aloud the upper word in each pair and press 
a response key any time a small dot replaces one of the two words. 
Faster detection of the dot probe if it replaces a threatening word, 
as opposed to a non-threatening word, indicates attentional bias to 
threatening stimuli. The attentional search paradigm requires 
subjects to identify a neutral word target in the presence of two 
distractor words. Slower reaction times in the presence of threat 
distractors, as opposed to neutral distractors, suggests attentional 
bias to threatening stimuli.
Validity and Reliability of Experimental Methods. According to 
a recent review by Logan and Goetsch (1993), evidence of retest 
reliability has only been reported for the different Stroop methods. 
These reviewers also concluded that while discriminant validity has 
been demonstrated for all the experimental methods, construct 
validity has not. Basic questions have been raised over which of the 
experimental paradigms provide the most valid test of attentional 
bias. For example, the original Stroop test has been criticized as a 
poor test of selective attention (e.g., Treisman, 1969) because it 
presents targets (colors of words) and distracting stimuli (words) in 
identical areas of the visual field. Critics such as Fox (1993) 
argue that appropriate tests for selective attention require the to- 
be-attended and distracting information be presented in spatially 
separate locations (e.g., Fox, 1993). The dot probe and attentional 
search tasks meet this criteria and have demonstrated reliable
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attentional biases in groups differing in their level of anxiety 
(Fox, 1992; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mathews, May, Mogg, and Eysenck, 
1990).
Although Mathews (1990) believes that only the dot probe 
paradigm directly measures attentional capture, Fox (1993) has argued 
that subjects can circumvent this attentional task with appropriate 
strategies. She suggests that modified Stroop tasks (e.g., those 
which employ masking) and the attentional search paradigm are better 
tests of the capacity to ignore distraction which appears outside the 
focus of attention. According to Mathews (1990), however, 
attentional bias can only be inferred from slower reaction times to 
distracting stimuli in the attentional search task. For example, a 
heightened negative affect due to exposure to threatening words 
rather than an attentional bias to threatening information may 
explain the performance interference in the attentional search task. 
While alternative explanations such as this cannot be completely 
ruled out, similarities between the results of the different 
attentional paradigms argue that the most parsimonious conclusion is 
that the interference effect is a function of attentional bias 
(Mathews, 1990).
It is important to note that information processing paradigms of 
selective attention have yet to establish at what point in the 
cognitive system selective biases are occurring (Fox, 1993). It may 
be that attentional selection processes only "early" or low-level 
perceptual features of stimuli, rather than "late" semantic meaning. 
Although recent evidence of interference from to-be-ignored stimuli
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favors late over early selection accounts, subtle discrepancies in 
the basic cognitive literature have led some to propose hybrid models 
involving a flexible locus for visual selection (Yantis & Johnson, 
1990). Debate will surely continue until this issue is resolved 
conclusively by empirical evidence. It is unlikely, however, that 
repetition priming of low-level perceptual features can account for 
the findings, because reliable attentional biases have been shown for 
anxious individuals under conditions where stimulus words are 
presented only once, as well as conditions in which word stimuli are 
repeated (Fox, 1993).
Specificity of Threat. Attentional specificity to threatening 
stimuli has been demonstrated across a number of anxiety-prone 
populations. Populations as diverse as subjects with PTSD (McNally, 
Kaspi, Riemann, & Zeitlin, 1990), spider phobia (Watts, McKenna, 
Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986), and social phobia (Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, 
& Dombeck, 1990) have displayed interference effects specific to 
their areas of clinical concern. Furthermore, specificity to 
physically threatening stimuli has been demonstrated in a number of 
clinically anxious subjects, including those with panic disorder 
(Ehlers, Margraf, Davies, & Roth, 1988; McNally, Riemann, & Kim) and 
generalized anxiety disorder patients who reported worrying more 
about illness than social concerns (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, 
Mathews, & Weinman, 1989). Therefore, it is plausible to suggest 
that a disorder such as hypochondriasis, which is characterized by 
preoccupation with, and fear of, illness would be associated with a 
similar attentional interference effect to illness-related stimuli.
Relation to Perceived Risk. It is at least possible that 
enhanced sensitivity to illness-related information, however 
acquired, functions as a maintaining or exacerbating factor in 
hypochondriacal anxiety (Hitchcock & Mathews, 1992). If attention is 
repeatedly drawn to information relevant to illness, the availability 
of that information in memory will be enhanced, and the perceived 
risk of acquiring that disease increased (Lichtenstein, Slovic, 
Fischoff, Layman & Combs, 1978). If particular bodily symptoms are 
believed to be typical of those associated with a feared disease, 
these symptoms may also come to attract special attention, and then 
be interpreted as confirming evidence of that disease via the 
representativeness heuristic (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982). A 
bias in judgments of self-related future negative events specific to 
illness is consistent with clinical descriptions of hypochondriasis. 
Inflation of subjective health risk may motivate the well known 
hypochondriacal behaviors of doctor shopping, bodily checking and 
reassurance seeking.
Subjective Risk
Although misinterpretation of ambiguous physical sensations has 
received the most attention as the form of biased judgment 
responsible for hypochondriasis, only conditional support has been 
demonstrated for this cognitive distortion (Hitchcock & Mathews,
1992). It may be that a different form of judgmental bias, 
elevations of subjective health risk, may play a more central role in 
the production and maintenance of hypochondriacal anxiety.
Subjective risk estimates involve probability judgments on the
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likelihood of the occurrence of future events (e.g., that a 
Republican candidate will win the presidential election in 1996).
Such judgments appear to be based upon the availability heuristic, or 
the ease with which examples of such events can be remembered or 
imagined (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).
Systematic biases in judgment can be demonstrated in individuals 
when they make judgments concerning uncertain events, because 
availability is sometimes poorly correlated with actual frequency or 
probability (Rodin, 1978). Probability judgments can be influenced 
by manipulations of information salience (Kahneman et al., 1982). 
Evidence exists that emotional disorders, manipulations of mood, or 
experimentally-induced stress can also affect judgments of future 
risks (Williams et al., 1988). For example, Butler and Mathews 
(1983) found that anxious and depressed subjects rate negative 
events as more likely to happen than normal controls. The finding 
that subjective risk judgments are mood sensitive appears to be 
reliable (e.g., Bower, 1983 ).
According to Rodin (1978), attributional biases and the 
availability heuristic affect estimations of the likelihood of 
becoming the victim of a disease. The operation of health-related 
subjective risk bias in hypochondriacs, however, has yet to be 
investigated. Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) have demonstrated that 
probability estimates of future negative health-related events among 
normals is moderated by health status (which may affect availability) 
and mood. Inflation of subjective health risk may therefore increase
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in hypochondriacs, especially in the presence of dysphoric mood or 
stress.
A Model of Hypochondriasis
It thus appears that a causal model may be postulated in which 
stress and depressed mood interact with the cognitive distortions of 
attentional bias to illness-related cues, and inflation of future 
negative health risk, to produce hypochondriacal concern. It has 
been argued, however, that important individual differences may 
underlie this process. Psychiatric patients, as opposed to normals, 
may process such information with dysfunctional schemas when negative 
mood states are activated (Teasdale, 1993). In such a model, the 
vulnerability underlying hypochondriacal concern would involve the 
activation of distorted illness-schemas. Thus, while stress or 
depression may increase innocuous symptom-reporting in normals, this 
process may be exaggerated in hypochondriacs and lead to abnormal 
illness behaviors.
Thus, the occurrence of a stressor, whether illness-related 
(e.g., illness of relative) or illness-irrelevant (e.g., argument 
with family member), may activate a negative mood state and produce 
changes in accessibility of congruent information. In 
hypochondriacal individuals, this may be distorted information about 
illness schematically arranged in memory. A health-related stimulus 
(e.g., newspaper report of new disease) may also directly prime this 
information. A change in availability may lead to the recall of 
mood-congruent memories, as well as selective allocation of attention 
in scanning the environment for congruent information. As argued
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earlier, if attention is repeatedly drawn to information relevant to 
illness, then the availability of that information in memory will be 
further enhanced, and the perceived risk of becoming ill will be 
increased. This inflation of negative health risk then results in 
hypochondriacal concern. Although an empirical relationship has yet 
to be established between attentional bias and subjective risk, 
availability mediated by an association network (Bower, 1981) has 
been postulated as an underlying mechanism for both subjective risk 
judgments and selective allocation of attentional resources (e.g., 
Williams et al., 1988). The proposed model also allows the 
possibility of a circular process by which hypochondriacal concerns 
are maintained. The hypochondriacal fears may in turn become 
illness-relevant stressors themselves and lead to further priming of 
distorted illness information and increases in dysphoric mood, 
continuing the cycle.
Purpose of Study and Hypotheses
Although cognitive theories of hypochondriasis have generally 
proposed that selective attention and misinterpretation of bodily 
sensations are important etiological factors in hypochondriasis, 
little empirical research has been conducted on these cognitive 
distortions. The present study investigated attentional bias, as 
measured by an attentional search information processing paradigm, 
and biased judgment, as measured by subjective risk estimates of 
future events, in medical patients differing in levels of health 
anxiety, or hypochondriacal concern. Because the diagnosis of 
hypochondriasis depends upon the discrepancy between subjective and
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objective health, level of hypochondriacal concern was controlled by- 
physician ratings of global health status.
As cognitive theories imply that hypochondriacs have specific 
attentional and interpretive biases to illness-related information, 
the content-specificity of the proposed cognitive distortions were 
tested. Therefore, threatening stimuli from another domain were 
included in the attentional bias task and subjective risk estimates 
to determine if purported cognitive biases in hypochondriasis are 
specific to illness-related stimuli, or are only a manifestation of a 
more general sensitivity to all potential threats. Socially- 
threatening words were chosen as the contrast category because 
physical and social threat words are the most commonly contrasted 
content domains in investigations of attentional bias in anxiety 
(e.g., Fox, 1993; Hope et al., 1990; Mathews et al., 1990). In 
addition, because hypochondriacal concern has been linked in clinical 
lore and empirical research to interpersonal or emotional distress, 
it was thought that this contrast would provide the strongest test of 
the content-specificity hypothesis.
Therefore, the present study examined the hypothesis that 
hypochondriacal concerns are associated with a specific attentional 
bias for illness-related, as opposed to socially threatening, 
stimuli. Similarly, the study also examined whether hypochondriacal 
concerns were more strongly associated with an inflation of 
subjective risk in judgments of future negative events concerning 
health, as opposed to socially negative events. Past research has 
also indicated that experimentally-induced stress and dysphoric mood
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are associated with cognitive distortions in trait anxious 
individuals. In addition, clinical lore, theory, and research 
suggest that hypochondriacal concern is associated with stress and 
exacerbated by depressed mood. Therefore, the present study tested 
the prediction that depressed mood would interact with illness- 
related cognitive distortions to produce hypochondriacal concern.
The relation between hypochondriacal concern and minor life events 
was also examined.
In summary, by investigating cognitive processes in individuals 
differing in levels of hypochondriacal concern, the investigator 
attempted to answer the following questions:
1. Is self-reported hypochondriacal concern associated with 
attentional bias to illness-related cues, as opposed to socially- 
threatening cues? It was hypothesized that attentional interference 
from illness-related cues would predict significantly more variance in 
hypochondriacal concern than attentional interference from socially- 
threatening stimuli.
2. Is self-reported hypochondriacal concern associated with 
inflation of future subjective health risk? Based upon cognitive 
theories of hypochondriasis and studies of subjective risk, it was 
hypothesized that judgments of future negative health events would 
predict significantly more variance in hypochondriacal concern than 
judgments of future negative social events.
3. What is the relation among depression, cognitive distortions in 
attentional bias and subjective risk, and hypochondriacal concerns?
It was also hypothesized that depressed mood would significantly
interact with attentional interference from illness-related cues in 
the prediction of hypochondriacal concerns. Similarly, it was 
hypothesized that a significant interaction would be obtained between 
depressed mood, and judgments of future health events in the 
prediction of hypochondriacal concerns.
4. What are the causal and directional influences of objective 
health status, stressful minor life events, depression, attentional 
bias to illness-related cues, and subjective risk of future health 
events on hypochondriacal concerns? An exploratory path analysis 
tested the proposed causal contributions of objective health status, 
minor life events, depressed mood, attentional bias, and subjective 
risk in the production of hypochondriacal concern.
METHODS
Subjects
Subjects were 200 adult volunteers recruited from 2 general 
medicine outpatient clinics at Earl K. Long Medical Center. This 
Southern hospital provides services for indigent patients, most of 
whom are between 16-65 years of age. Females comprise 64.7% of the 
patient population. A majority of patients are black (77.2%), while 
21.5% are white and 1.3% are classified as "other". Inclusion 
criteria for the study were: if patients were between 21 and 65 years 
of age, if they had been registered at the clinic for at least one 
year, and if they granted access to their hospital medical records. 
Subjects were excluded from participation if they were illiterate, if 
they reported that they were unable to read the questionnaires (e.g., 
because of poor eyesight or because reading glasses were left at 
home), or if they reported having a terminal illness (e.g., cancer). 
Subjects having a physical disability which have would interfered 
with their ability to use a computer keyboard with both hands were 
also excluded from the study.
Measures
Demographic and Medical Status Questionnaire. This 
questionnaire was created to collect basic demographic information 
including age, gender, marital status, socioeconomic status, and 
other demographic variables on all subjects (see Appendix A). Three 
questions also asked subjects if they had ever been diagnosed with a 
life-threatening disease such as cancer, the reason for their
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appointment at the clinic (e.g., routine check-up, current illness), 
and how long they had been enrolled at the clinic.
Physician Rating Scale. This rating scale was created to measure 
objective health status. It was adapted from procedures commonly 
used to rate health in studies of hypochondriasis (e.g., Barsky et 
al., 1986; Mabe et al., 1988). Although physician ratings based on 
this method provide some objective information pertaining to health 
status, they are at best only a measure of aggregate medical 
morbidity (Barsky et al., 1986). The scale asks physicians to rate a 
patient's global physical health using verbal anchors on a 7 point 
Likert-type scale, ranging from '0 - patient is in good physical 
health with a history of only routine minor illnesses' to '6 - 
patient has a terminal illness, death is imminent1. Rating scales 
such as this demonstrate adequate interrater reliability (e.g., Mabe 
et al., 1988). The rating scale is reproduced in its entirety in 
Appendix B.
Illness Attitude Scales (IAS). All subjects were screened with 
the Illness Attitude Scales (IAS: Kellner et al., 1987) to measure 
hypochondriacal concern. The IAS is a 29-item instrument designed to 
measure attitudes, fears, and beliefs associated with 
hypochondriasis. Based upon the factor analytic work of Pilowsky 
(1967) and Bianchi (1973), the IAS measures several commonly 
recognized components of hypochondriasis, including worry about 
illness, disease phobia, bodily preoccupation, and thanatophobia.
The items are rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale and can be summed 
to yield a composite score ranging from 0 to 116. Kellner and his
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associates (1987) report a test-retest reliability of .87 for the 
IAS. This measure has been shown to differentiate between patients 
with DSM-III diagnosed hypochondriasis and various other groups, 
including normal controls, other psychiatric patients, and general 
medical outpatients (Kellner et al., 1987).
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D).
The CES-D (Radloff, 1977) was used to measure depressed mood. It is 
a 20-item self-report inventory which assesses the number and 
frequency of depressive symptoms experienced in the past week. The 
scale was designed to measure current level of depressive 
symptomatology with emphasis on the affective component, depressed 
mood (Rehm, 1988). Because only a small proportion of CES-D items 
address vegetative symptoms of depression, it is unlikely to be 
confounded with symptoms of physical illness in a medical population. 
The CES-D can be viewed as a measure of non-specific psychological 
distress as it also seems to measure anxiety and self-esteem (Orme, 
Reis, & Herz, 1986). The instrument has very good psychometric 
properties (Rehm, 1988) and extensive normative data are available 
(Lewinsohn & Lee, 1981 ). The CES-D has good internal consistency 
with alphas of roughly .85 for the general population and .90 for 
psychiatric populations. Split-half and Spearman-Brown reliability 
coefficients range from .77 to .92 (Radloff, 1977).
Weekly Stress Inventory (WSI). The WSI (Brantley & Jones, 1988) 
was used to assess minor life events. It is an 87-item self-report 
scale which lists minor stressful events that a person might 
experience throughout the week. Each item is rated on an 8-point
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Likert-type scale, ranging from 0 ("did not happen") to 7 ("extremely 
stressful"). The measure yields an Event score (WSI-E), which is the 
total number of events endorsed, and an Impact score (WSI-I), which 
gives the sum of subjective ratings of distress for the events. 
Correlations of the WSI Event and Impact scores to their respective 
counterparts on the Daily Stress Inventory (Brantley & Jones, 1989) 
are .77 and .84 (Brantley & Jones, 1988). Principal components 
factor analysis of the WSI reveals one factor with an alpha 
coefficient of .95, suggesting that the items consistently measure 
the same construct of "stress".
Subjective Risk Questionnaire. This experimental instrument was 
derived from that developed by Butler and Mathews (1987) to assess 
subjective risk probabilities. The items have high face validity and 
directly ask subjects to make judgments concerning the probabilities 
of future events. The questionnaire does not purport to be a measure 
of a stable trait, and the respondents' judgments themselves 
constitute the data of interest. Therefore, standard psychometric 
measures of reliability are not usually reported for assessments of 
subjective probabilities (e.g., Bower, 1983; Johnson & Tversky, 1983; 
Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989). However, judgments of subjective risk 
have been demonstrated to change meaningfully with manipulations of 
priming and mood state among normals and emotionally disturbed 
individuals (Williams et al., 1988), consistent with theoretical 
interpretations in terms of availability.
For the current study, subjects rated 30 items on a 9-point 
scale in answer to the question "What is the probability that...?"
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All items employed the 2nd person (e.g., "you") to assess subjects' 
personal probabilities. Half of the items referred to positive and 
half to negative events. To test the central hypothesis on the 
content specificity of cognitive distortions in individuals with 
hypochondriacal concern, ten of the items referred to health-related 
events, whereas ten other items referred to social-related events.
The remaining ten filler items referred to financial events. The 
type and valence of items were presented in balanced order. (See 
Appendix C for the questionnaire.)
Attentional Bias Task
The attentional search task described by Mathews et al., (1990) 
was used to assess attentional bias. The task is supposed to measure 
the extent to which subjects can avoid distraction during a visual 
search. During the task, subjects are required to identify the 
target words "left" or "right" on a computer screen and to respond by 
pressing the appropriate button as rapidly as possible. For each 
trial, three fixation crosses are displayed in a vertical column, 
with the target replacing one of the crosses in any of the three 
positions. At the same time that the target is displayed, two 
distractor words appear simultaneously and replace the two remaining 
crosses in the vertical column.
Materials. Two categories of negative distractor words were 
used to test the main hypotheses of the attentional bias experiment: 
that hypochondriacal subjects would selectively attend to illness- 
related, as opposed to socially threatening words. Two categories of 
positive and neutral words were also included to control for baseline
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reaction time and to balance the emotional valence of stimuli. To 
control for possible categorical priming effects in the positive and 
neutral items, words within these categories were semantically 
related. Thus, the distractor words comprised one of four semantic 
categories: neutral words representative of items commonly found in
a house (e.g., bucket), positive words implying wealth or riches 
(e.g., diamond), negative words which are interpersonally- or 
socially-threatening (e.g., divorce), and negative words related to 
concerns about illness (e.g., symptoms of illnesses or names of 
diseases such as cancer).
Words used for the task were drawn from a large pool of items 
that were semantically related to the 4 categories described above. 
All words in the pool were between 4 and 7 letters long. So that 
degree of stimulus emotionality and threat could be controlled in 
forming categories, two panels of judges were asked to rate each word 
in the pool. The first 8-member panel was asked to rate each word on 
how threatening it was using a 7-point Likert Scale (0 - Extremely 
Threatening to 6 - Not at All Threatening). Similarly, a different 
panel of 8 judges was asked to rate each word on emotional valence 
using a 7-point Likert Scale (0 - Extremely Negative to 6 - Extremely 
Positive). Words were selected for the 4 previously described 
categories (neutral, positive, and the 2 negative categories) based 
upon these ratings.
A complete list of the 160 distractors actually used in the 
experiment is presented by category in Appendix D. The mean word 
length, frequency of usage, and judges' ratings for each category are
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Table 1.
Word Categories by Mean Length, Frequency, and Ratings
Illness Social Neutral Positive
Length 5.30 5.60 5.58 5.63
Frequency 29.35 28.40 28.80 28.63
Rating
Valence 1.48= 1.54= 3.33b 4.35a
Threat 3.33b 3.65^ 5.84a 5.58a
Note. Within the valence and threat ratings, means with the same 
letter are not significantly different
presented in Table 1. An analysis of variance indicated that the 
words were equated such that there were no significant differences in 
word length across categories [F(3,156) = 0.87, ns]. Similarly, the 
words were also equated across categories [F(3,156)=0.00, ns] on 
frequency of usage in the United States based on norms provided by 
Francis and Kucera (1982). The words were also tested for 
readability with Grammatik IV (Reference Software International,
1989) which revealed that the average word in the distractor list was 
1.42 syllables long, indicating that most readers could understand 
the vocabulary based on the criteria of syllables per word.
Analysis of variance indicated the expected pattern of 
significant differences across categories for judges' ratings on 
threat [F(3,156) = 175.47, p < 0.0001] and valence [F(3,156)=288.35, p 
< 0.0001]. Multiple contrasts (see Table 1) revealed that the social 
and illness word categories were not significantly different on 
valence or threat ratings, suggesting that the judges viewed the 
words comprising these categories as equally negative and 
threatening. In contrast, the words comprising neutral and positive 
categories were rated as significantly different from the two 
negative categories, but not from each other, on the threat ratings. 
Finally, the judges rated the positive-rich word category as 
significantly more positive than the neutral category, which was 
rated as significantly more positive than the two negative 
categories. The words were assigned to one of two parallel forms 
that presented only one-half (N=20) of the 40 possible distractors 
from each of the 4 categories. Words within categories were equated
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on mean word length, frequency, and threat and valence ratings across 
parallel forms.
Task. Subjects were seated in a sound-attenuated room in front 
of a color monitor controlled by a CompuAdd 286 computer programmed 
with Micro Experimental Lab (MEL) software (Schneider, 1988). The 
MEL software was programmed to log the response time and response 
accuracy of each response. Instructions for the task were presented 
on the computer. Subjects were asked to respond as quickly and as 
rapidly as possible on seeing the word "left" or "right", while 
ignoring any other words that appeared on the screen. The < and > 
keys on the computer keyboard were used to indicate "left" and 
"right" responses and were marked accordingly. Subjects were given 
instructions to press the < key with their left hand in response to 
the word left and to press the > key with their right hand in 
response to the word right. Practice trials with feedback on 
accuracy were given prior to presentation of the experimental trials 
to ensure that subjects understood task instructions.
Each trial began with the presentation of three fixation crosses 
arranged in a vertical column. Exact location of the crosses varied 
slightly on each trial to discourage subjects from staring at a fixed 
position on the screen. After a display of 500 ms, the three crosses 
were replaced by the target and two distractors from the same 
category. Subjects responded to the presentation of the words with a 
key press, which terminated, the display. After a 500 ms blackout, 
followed by a "get ready" signal display for 500 ms, the next trial 
began. Display of target word (i.e., left or right) position was
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completely randomized. The distractor pairs were presented in a 
fixed-random order, with each distractor pair appearing four times, 
twice with the target word "right" and twice with the target word 
"left". The two distractor words were also switched between the 
remaining upper and lower locations for the two presentations with 
each target word. Overall, 10 distractor word pairs in each of the 4 
categories were presented four times for a total of 160 trials. Rest 
breaks were presented after every 40 trials.
Procedure
Consecutive adult attenders to the Earl K. Long Medical Center 
Family Practice Clinic and Walk-In Clinic were asked to volunteer for 
a study designed to examine the effects of attitudes and stress on 
health. In order to test literacy and vision as a control for 
performance on the attentional search task, volunteers were first 
screened with the Word Attack Subtest of the Woodcock-Johnson Psycho- 
educational Battery (Woodcock & Johnson, 1977). Individuals missing 
any word at the 6th grade reading level or who reported that they 
were having difficulty reading (e.g., because of uncorrected vision) 
were excluded from the study. Volunteers who met criteria for 
inclusion in the study were asked to sign an informed consent sheet 
(see Appendix E) that described the study, specified their rights as 
research participants, and granted the experimenters access to 
hospital medical records.
Subjects were then asked to complete the Demographic/Medical 
Status Questionnaire, the Illness Attitude Scale, the CES-D, the 
Weekly Stress Inventory, and the Subjective Probability
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Questionnaire. Subjects then were randomly assigned one of the two 
parallel forms for the attentional bias task. After completing the 
task, subjects proceeded to their regularly scheduled appointment 
after which their personal physician completed the objective health 
status physician rating form. All subjects were paid $5.00 for 
participating and debriefed after they completed the experimental 
tasks. A board-certified Family Practice physician with board- 
eligibility in Psychiatry and 15 years of experience in general 
medicine outpatient clinics later reviewed each subject's medical 
chart and completed a second physician rating form for each subject 
as a check for inter-rater reliability. The physicians were blind to 




The health status ratings made by the subjects' personal 
physicians at the time of their appointment and participation in the 
experiment were designated Physician 1 ratings, while the ratings 
resulting from the medical chart review were designated Physician 2 
ratings. Both sets of ratings ranged from 0 to 5. Neither set of 
ratings utilized the number 6 point on the scale ("patient has a 
terminal illness; death is imminent"), indicating that the exclusion 
criteria were successful in screening out patients with illnesses 
which were immediately life-threatening. The rating sets had 
comparable averages, with a mean of 1.76 for Physician 1 ratings and 
a mean of 1.84 for Physician 2 ratings. The two rating sets were 
moderately correlated (r = 0.53, p < .0001 ). The modest discrepancy 
most likely resulted from the different processes by which the two 
ratings were made, one from a global impression by the patient's 
private physician during an actual medical appointment, the other 
from a careful review of the patient's medical chart. The physician 
ratings were averaged to reduce error variance and this combined 
physician rating was used in subsequent regression analyses to 
control for objective health status among subjects. The 
generalizability coefficient (Crocker & Algina, 1986) for the average 
of the two ratings was .69.
Sociodemoqraphic Data
Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in Table 2. 







Sex 200 87.5 (female)
12.5 (male)
Race 200 75.0 (black)
24.5 (white)
0.5 (other)
Marital 194 64.9 (single)
35.1 (married)
Education 199 39.2 (< 12 years)
36.2 (12 years)
21.6 (> 12 years)
2.5 (college grad
0.5 (grad school)





1 .1 (> 50,000)
Variable N % Minimum Maximum
Age 200 21 65
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remaining 12.5% were males. Subjects ranged in age from 21 to 65 
years, with a mean age of 40.5 years. A majority of the sample was 
black (75%), compared with 24.5% subjects who were white. An 
additional 0.5% described their race as "other". Approximately 65% 
of the subjects were single (either never married, divorced, or 
widowed), while 35% were married. Seventy-five percent of the 
subjects reported having completed some high school or having 
obtained a high school diploma. An additional 21.6% had some college 
or university hours. Only 3% of the sample reported having an 
undergraduate degree or advanced graduate/professional school 
training. Twenty-four percent of the subjects declined to indicate 
their income level. Of those subjects who responded, approximately 
93% of the subjects reported income levels of $20,000 per year or 
less, while 5.7% of the subjects reported yearly income between 
$20,000 and $50,000. Only 1.1% of the subjects reported income 
levels above $50,000. Although the modal subject from this sample 
was female, black, poor, and relatively uneducated, the sample 
reflected the demographic trends of the patient population of the 
southern charity hospital where this study was conducted.
In order to examine the effects of the dichotomous demographic 
variables on the dependent variable of interest, hypochondriacal 
concern, three groups were formed based upon subjects' IAS scores and 
physician ratings. Subjects who obtained a combined physician rating 
above 2.0 were assigned to the "SICK" group (N=82). Among subjects 
with combined physician ratings of a 2 or less, those who scored at 
or below the median (i.e., 40) of the IAS were assigned to the
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"NORMAL" group (N=66); while those who scored above 40 were assigned
to the "HYPOCHONDRIACAL" group (N=52). Possible confounds between
the demographic factors of sex, race, and marital status and the 3
groups differing on their level of objective health status and
hypochondriacal concern were then tested with chi-square analyses.
The results indicated no significant differences between the
observed and expected frequencies among the 3 groups on sex
[X^(2)=0.60, p = .74], race [X^(2)=5.39, p = .07], and marital status 
2[X (2)=2.02, p = .37]. Furthermore, age and hypochondriacal concern 
were not correlated (r = -.02, ns). Because of the restricted range 
of education and income levels in the sample, the association between 
hypochondriacal concern and these two demographic variables were not 
tested. In light of these findings, none of the sociodemographic 
variables were included in subsequent analyses.
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Experimental Data 
Descriptive statistics of the experimental variables are 
presented in Table 3. Illness Attitude Scales global mean scores 
ranged from 6 to 85 with a mean of 41.33 and standard deviation of 
14.8. This mean is higher than that reported by Kellner and his 
associates (1987) for groups of randomly selected family practice 
patients (29.6), psychiatric patients (24.0), and employee controls 
(17.5), but lower than that, reported for a group of hypochondriacal 
patients who met DSM-III-R criteria for the disorder (61.7).
Correlations between the IAS and experimental variables are 
reported in Tables 4 and 5. Consistent with other findings in the 
literature, the correlation between hypochondriacal concern as
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Table 3.
Descriptive Statistics of Experimental Variables
Variable Mean Std Minimum Maximum
Illness Attitude Scales 41.33 14.8 6 85
Combined Physician Ratings 1.80 1 .34 0 5
Center for Epidemiological 19.67 11.58 0 53
Studies-Depression Scale
Weekly Stress Inventory 28.95 18.42 0 87
Event Scores
Weekly Stress Inventory 92.95 83.48 0 492
Impact Scores
Attentional Bias RTs
Illness 1039.11 290.21 608 2708
Social-Threat 1032.21 293.60 626 2897
Positive-Rich 1029.25 281.13 622 2618
Neutral 1021.12 281.61 614 2854
Subjective Risk Ratings 
Illness -1 .00 13.25 -32 32
Social -1 .23 11 .54 -26 26
Financial -2.09 12.29 -38 30
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Table 4.
Correlation Matrix of Experimental Variables 
with Attentional Bias RTs
Attentional Bias RTs



































































Correlation Matrix of Experimental Variables 












Subjective Risk Ratings 
Health
Social
Subjective Risk Ratings 
WSI Health Social Financial
0.34 0.20 0.10 0.18
.0001 .0044 .1629 .0100
-0.12 -0.01 -0.10 -0.09
.0870 .9017 .1572 .1956
0.52 0.13 0.09 0.03
.0001 .0685 .2141 .6924







measured by the IAS and objective health status as measured by the 
combined physician ratings was not significant (r = .13, p < 0.08).
As expected, the CES-D had a larger zero-order correlation with the 
IAS scores than any of the other variables [r = .42, p < .0001]. 
Because the correlation between the IAS and the WSI-Irnpact score (r_ = 
0.33, p < 0.0001) was larger than the correlation between the IAS and 
the WSI-Event score (r = 0.24, p < 0.0005), the WSI-Impact score was 
used in the subsequent regression analyses predicting hypochondriacal 
concern. None of the correlations between any of the subjective risk 
estimates or attentional reaction times (see Table 6) were 
significant.
Analyses of Attentional Bias Reaction Times
Only the reaction times (RTs) of 188 subjects were used in the 
attentional bias results. RTs for three subjects were lost as a 
result of hardware failure. One subject, withdrew from the study 
prior to completing the attentional bias task. An additional eight 
subjects had less than a 90% accuracy rate on the attentional bias 
task, suggesting global inattentiveness, so their RTs were deleted 
from analysis. Given the nature of raw RT data, most researchers 
employ some technique to eliminate outliers, such as the use of 
median scores and trimming. The most popular technique involves 
elimination of all points beyond some criterion (Bush, Hess, and 
Wolford, 1993). Therefore, reaction times were filtered to exclude 
outliers less than 100 milliseconds (as probable anticipation 
errors), or more than three standard deviations above the mean for 
all responses (attributed to inattentiveness). Mean RTs were then
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Table 6 .
Correlation Matrix of Attentional Bias RTs 
and Subjective Risk Ratings
Attentional Bias RTs______  Subjective Risk Ratines
Illness Social Positive Neutral Health Social Financ
Attentional Bias
Illness 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.06 0.03 -0.02
.0001 .0001 .0001 .3792 .6823 .7901
Social 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.06 0.04 -0.02
.0001 .0001 .4410 .6030 .7447
Positive (Rich) 1.00 0.97 0.06 0.02 -0.03
.0001 .4136 .7969 .6578
Neutral 1.00 0.07 0.03 -0.02
.3397 .7253 .7363
Subjective Risk Ratings
Health 1.00 0.49 0.50
.0001 .0001
Financial 1.00
recalculated for each condition for each subject. The global mean 
RTs for the four word categories across all subjects were in the 
expected pattern (see Table 3, p. 48), with RTs fastest for the neutral 
words (1021 ms) and slowest for the two negative word categories: 
illness (1039 ms) and social-threat (1032 ms). The mean RT for the 
positive rich word category attained an intermediate position at 1029 
ms. The four RTs were highly correlated, ranging between .97-.98 
(see Table 4, p. 49). The combined physician ratings were moderately 
correlated with all four RT word types, indicating that a general 
slowing in reaction time was associated with poorer health status.
Exploratory Stepwise Regression with Attentional Bias RTs. To 
test the main hypotheses concerning threat specificity in attentional 
bias, the RTs for illness and social threat words were entered into 
an exploratory stepwise regression, along with the CES-D and WSI 
scores, to predict hypochondriacal concern as measured by the IAS 
after controlling for objective health status and neutral reaction 
time. The interaction term combining CES-D and the illness RT mean 
was also included among the variables to be stepped in to test the 
hypothesis that an interaction between attentional bias to illness 
cues and mood would significantly predict hypochondriacal concern. A 
power analysis for the above regression indicated that for 188 cases 
and. seven predictor variables, the probability of detecting the 
extent to which each of the IVs made a unique contribution to the 
dependent variable [estimating f at .04/(1-.35) = .062] was 
approximately 70 per cent (for a = .05, L = 11.16).
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Table 7.
Summary of Variab3.es Entered in Stepwise Regression




R Z F P
Physician
Rating 0
Neutral RT 0 0.03 0.03 3.21 0.0426
CES-D 1 0.16 0.20 37.67 0.0001
WSI-Impact 2 0.03 0.23 6.55 0.0113
Social RT 3 0.01 0.24 2.75 0.0990
Social RT 4 0.01 0.23 2.75 0.0990
Note. Illness RT and the interaction term did not meet criteria 
for entry into the model.
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The results of the stepwise regression are presented in Table 7. 
The combined physician rating and neutral RTs were entered into the 
regression, resulting in an R-square of 0.03 [F(2,185)=3.21, p < 
0.05). With the significance level for entry into the model set at 
0.15, the CES-D scores stepped in first and predicted 16% incremental 
variance [F(3,184)=37.67, p < 0.0001], while WSI scores entered 
second and predicted 3% incremental variance [F(4,183)=6.55, p <
0.02]. Although the social threat mean RTs entered next, it was not 
significant at the .05 level and was therefore deleted. Neither the 
illness RT mean or the interaction term met criterion for entry into 
the model. The overall model predicted 23% of the variance in IAS 
scores [F(4,183)=13.32, p < 0.0001.
In light of the intriguing pattern of results of the stepwise 
regression, a decision was made to re-analyze the data with a 
trimming procedure suggested by Bush and her associates (1993).
Using Monte Carlo simulations, these investigators tested the ability 
of different types of transformations to improve power in within- 
subject designs employing reaction time data. Their results clearly 
indicated that trimming was more effective than eliminating all 
points beyond a criterion. The trimming technique which they used, 
eliminating the highest and lowest score for each subject in each 
condition, was superior to criterion elimination with both normally 
distributed and skewed data. Furthermore, this technique was not 
found to increase the probability of a Type I error (Bush et al., 
1993).
56
Therefore, the highest and lowest RT scores from each of the 4 
word types for each subject were eliminated. The means were 
recalculated and the results are presented in Table 8. The global 
trimmed means show a slightly different pattern of results from the 
original means. Although the mean RTs for the illness words were 
again the slowest (1033 ms), the social-threat RTs and positive-rich 
RTs means were equivalent (1022 ms). The neutral RTs were fastest 
(1013 ms). The trimmed RT data were entered into a stepwise 
regression predicting hypochondriacal concern as described above.
The combined physician ratings and the neutral RTs were entered, 
resulting in an R-square of .03 [F(2,185)=2.88, p < 0.06]. CES-D 
scores stepped in first [F(3,184)-38.02, p < 0.0001] and predicted an 
additional 17% of the variance, followed by WSI scores [F(4,183)= 
6.53, p < 0.02] which predicted 3% of incremental variance. The 
trimmed mean RT for social words entered last [F(5,182)=6.06, 
p < .02] and also predicted 3% additional variance. Neither the 
trimmed mean illness RT nor the interaction term met the 0.15 
criterion level for entry into the model. The overall model 
predicted 25% of the variance in IAS scores (see Table 9).
Analyses of Subjective Risk Estimates
Descriptive statistics of the positive, negative, and total 
subjective risk ratings for the future health, social, and financial 
events are presented in Table 10. Total rating scores for each 
domain were created by adding the ratings (on a 0 to 8 scale) for the 
5 future positive events and the 5 future negative events. The 
ratings for the negative events received negative signs. The total
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Table 8.
Trimmed Reaction Times for Word Categories
Mean Std Minimum Maximum
Illness RT 1033 ms 304 ms 606 ms 3014 ms
Social RT 1022 ms 292 ms 623 ms 2940 ms
Positive RT 1022 ms 290 ms 621 ms 2848 ms
Neutral RT 1013 ms 295 ms 613 ms 3246 ms
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Table 9.
Summary of Variables Entered in Stepwise Regression









Neutral RT 0 0.03 0.03 2.88 0.0589
CES-D 1 0.17 0.20 38.02 0.0001
WSI-Impact 2 0.03 0.22 6.53 0.0114
Social RT 3 0.03 0.25 6.06 0.0147
Note. Illness RT and interaction term did not meet criteria for 
entry into the model.
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Table 10.
Mean Positive, Negative, and Total Subjective Risk Ratings
By Domain
Mean Minimum Maximum STD
Health Positive 14.45 0 40 7.79
Health Negative -15.45 0 -36 8.75
Social Positive 14.33 0 40 8.67
Social Negative -15.56 0 -37 8.14
Financial Positive 13.31 0 36 8.09
Financial Negative -15.40 0 -40 9.02
Health Total -1 .00 -32 32 13.25
Social Total -1 .23 -26 26 11.54
Financial Total -2.09 -38 30 12.29
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ratings could therefore range from -40 to +40 with a "0" indicating 
that subjects rated future negative events and future positive events 
as equally likely to occur.
The total mean scores for all 3 domains were negative, 
indicating that subjects in general rated future negative events as 
slightly more likely to occur than positive events. Correlations 
between the total subjective risk estimates and the other 
experimental variables were presented in Table 5 (see p. 50). The 
intercorrelations among subjective risk ratings ranged from .49 - 
.59 (p < .0001). Contrary to expectations, the correlations between 
the total subjective risk scores for the 3 domains and 
hypochondriacal concern were positive (illness r_ = .20, p < .01; 
social r = .10, ns; financial r = .18, p = .01). The same was true 
of the correlations between the total subjective risk scores and 
level of depression (illness r = .13, no; social r = .09, ns; 
financial r = .03, ns.). This indicates that subjects tended to rate 
positive future events as more likely to happen than future negative 
events as hypochondriacal concern and depression increased.
Exploratory Stepwise Regression with Subjective Risk Ratings.
To test the hypothesis that inflation of future negative health risk 
would predict hypochondriacal concern, the relations among 
hypochondriacal concern, mood, stress, and subjective risk were also 
assessed with multiple regression. Scores from the CES-D, WSI-Impact 
scores, subjective risk ratings for future health and social events, 
and the interaction between depression and future health risk 
probabilities were used to predict hypochondriacal concern as
measured by IAS scores in an exploratory stepwise regression, after 
controlling for objective health status as measured by the combined 
physician ratings. The specific purpose of the analysis was to: 1) 
test the content specificity hypothesis by determining whether 
increased subjective risk for negative health outcomes would predict 
significantly more of the variance in hypochondriacal concern than 
subjective risk estimates for negative social outcomes; and 2) 
whether mood would significantly interact with subjective risk 
estimates for health outcomes in predicting hypochondriacal concern. 
Power for this analysis to detect the unique contribution of each 
IV (200 cases, six predictor variables, L = 11.97, a = .05) was 
determined to be approximately 75 per cent.
The combined physician ratings were entered (see Table 11) and 
produced a Multiple R of .2 [F( 1,198)=3 - 20, p < .08]. With the 
significance level set at 0.15 for entry into the model, CES-D scores 
stepped in first and predicted 17% incremental variance 
[F(2,197)=41.97, p < 0.0001]. WSI scores stepped in second and 
predicted 3% incremental variance [F(3,196)=6.72, p < 0.02]. The 
subjective risk scores for future health events entered next 
[F(4,195)=6.70, p < 0.02] and predicted 3% incremental variance, 
while the interaction term entered last [F( 5,194)=3.90, p < 0.05] and 
predicted an additional 3% in incremental variance. The subjective 
risk ratings for future social events failed to meet, criterion for 
entry into the model. The full model predicted 26% variance in IAS 
scores [F(5,194)=13.40, p < 0.0001].
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Table 11.
Summary of Variables Entered in Stepwise Regression






Rating 0 0.02 0.02 3.20 0.0751
CES-D 1 0.17 0.19 41 .97 0.0001
WSI-inpact 2 0.03 0.22 6.72 0.0102
Ratings for Future 3 0.03 0.24 6.70 0.0103
Health Events
CES-D X Ratings 4 0.02 0.26 3.90 0.0497
for Future Health
Events
Examination of the parameter estimates revealed that the main 
effect for subjective risk estimates of future health events in 
predicting hypochondriacal concern was positive, similar to that of 
the zero-order correlation. This indicated that as hypochondriacal 
concern increased in the sample, positive future health events were 
rated as more likely to happen than negative events. The significant 
interaction term suggested that the regression of hypochondriacal 
concern on predictions of future health events varied with level of 
depression. Interestingly, the parameter estimate for the 
interaction term between ratings of future health events and 
depression was negative.
To clarify the interaction, separate regressions were performed 
for subjects differing on level of depression, based upon a median 
split of the CES-D scores. Among subjects scoring less than 17 on 
the CES-D, ratings of future health events predicted 18% incremental 
variance in hypochondriacal concern after controlling for objective 
health status [F(2,93)=11.95, p < .001]. The parameter estimate was 
positive for this regression. Among subjects scoring 17 or higher on 
the CES-D, however, the linear regression of hypochondriacal concern 
on predictions of future health events was practically nonexistent. 
After controlling for objective health status, predictions of future 
health events accounted for less than .01 incremental variance in 
hypochondriacal concern [F(2,101 )=0.11, ns] among depressed subjects.
Additional Analyses of Subjective Risk Ratings. In order to 
better understand the different relations between hypochondriacal 
concern and ratings of future health events among depressed and
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Table 12.
Total Mean Subjective Risk Ratings for Illness Events 
of HYPO Group by CES-D
Sick Normal Hypochondriacal
Low CES-D -5.31 -3.15 9.60
High CES-D 0.72 -0.90 -0.14
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nondepressed subjects, an ANOVA was performed to further analyze the 
subjective risk ratings. To do this, the 3 previously described HYPO 
(normal, sick, hypochondriacal) groups created to rule out possible 
confounds with sociodemographic variables were used. The HYPO groups 
were further divided by median split on their CES-D scores to compare 
subjective risk ratings of future health events (see Table 12).
The analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect for HYPO 
[F(2,194)=2.87, p < .02], but the main effect for DEPRESSION was not 
significant [F(1,194)=0.35, ns]. The interaction term, however, was 
significant [F(2,194)=5.33, p < .01]. For both normal and sick 
subjects, ratings of future positive illness events were rated as 
more likely among those who were depressed than those who were not. 
This pattern was reversed in the hypochondriacal subjects. Depressed 
hypochondriacal subjects rated future negative events as more likely 
to occur than future positive events compared to nondepressed 
subjects with hypochondriacal concern.
Path Analysis
The path analysis proposed for this project was performed to 
explore the direct and indirect contributions of objective health 
status, minor life events, dysphoric mood, attentional bias to 
illness stimuli, and subjective risk for future health events in 
their hypothesized relation with hypochondriacal concern as measured 
by IAS scores. The proposed causal model is presented in the path 
diagram in Figure 1. The model tested in the path analysis was 
recursive, testing the flow of causality in one direction only. The 





















Path diagram of proposed causal model of hypochondriasis (N=188)
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Table 13.
Path Analysis of Combined Physician Ratings, Weekly Stress, 
Depression, Attentional Bias to Illness, and Subjective Risk to 
Future Health Events on Hypochondriacal Concern (N=188)
r direct indirect
Physician Ratings .135 .144* .005
Weekly Stress .344* .211* .143*
Depression .420* .301* .017
Attentional Bias .080 .121 .002
Subjective Risk .205* .162* -
Note. * indicates p < .05
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model was hypothesized to have an effect on every later endogenous 
variable in the proposed path. Each variable was therefore regressed 
on all antecedent variables in the model. To control for baseline 
reaction time, linear regression was used to create a weighted 
difference score of the trimmed illness reaction times by removing 
its shared variance with the trimmed neutral reaction times.
Path coefficients are the estimates of the direct effect of a 
variable on the variable which it is assumed to cause. These 
coefficients may be interpreted in much the same manner as 
standardized beta weights in multiple regression. The path 
coefficients for the proposed causal model are presented in Figure 1. 
Table 13 also presents the direct and indirect effects of objective 
health status, weekly stress, depression, attentional bias to illness 
stimuli, and subjective risk for future health events on 
hypochondriacal concern. Objective health status, weekly stress, 
depression, and subjective risk ratings for future health events all 
had significant direct effects on hypochondriacal concern, with the 
direct effect of depression being the largest. The direct effects of 
attentional bias on subjective risk and hypochondriacal concern were 
not significant. Of all the variables in the model, only weekly 
stress had a significant indirect effect on hypochondriacal concern.
Additional Analyses. The path analysis failed to support 
attentional bias to illness stimuli as an important contributor to 
hypochondriacal concern. Although objective health status was 
statistically controlled for in the path analysis, it may be that 
attentional bias to illness stimuli is discontinuous across healthy
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subjects with hypochondriacal concern, and sick individuals with 
legitimate reasons to be worried about their health. In order to 
assure that the relation between hypochondriacal concern and 
attentional bias to illness words was not being masked by subjects 
who had actually had a serious illness, an additional path analysis 
was performed after deleting the data of the 78 subjects (out of the 
188 subjects with reaction time data) who had combined physician 
ratings greater than 2 (indicating poorer objective health status). 
This left 110 relatively healthy subjects for this analysis.
The exclusion of the sick subjects reduced the range of 
physician ratings and limited the causal impact of objective health 
status on the subsequent variables in the model. The path was 
therefore performed again with only the weekly stress scores, the 
depression scores, the weighted difference scores for the illness 
attentional bias reaction times, and the subjective risk ratings for 
future illness events. As before, the model was recursive and just- 
identified. The hypothesized path model and path coefficients are 
presented in Figure 2. Table 14 presents the direct and indirect 
effects of the variables in the proposed causal model.
The removal of individuals with a serious illness from the 
sample produced major changes in the path coefficients of the model 
such that the direct effects of weekly stress and subjective risk, as 
well as the indirect effect of weekly stress, were no longer 
significant. The decline of the casual impact of subjective risk was 
undoubtedly due to its previously discussed complex, nonlinear 



















Path diagram with non-sick subjects (N=110)
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Table 14.
Path Analysis of Weekly Stress, Depression, Attentional Bias to 
Illness, and Subjective Risk to Future Health Events on 
Hypochondriacal Concern in Non-Sick Subjects (N=110)
r direct indirect
Weekly Stress .312* .149 .166
Depression .397* .329* -.007
Attentional Bias .120 .177* .006
Subjective Risk .170 .147 -
Note. * indicates p < .05
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Interestingly, the only variables which had significant direct 
effects on hypochondriacal concern were depression and attentional 
bias. Furthermore, most of the impact of depression and attentional 
bias on hypochondriacal concern was direct, that is, not mediated by 
any of the other measured variables. It thus appears that the direct 
effect of attentional bias on hypochondriacal concern occurred 
independently of depressed mood and the other measured variables in 
the sample of non-sick subjects.
This analysis, although suggestive that attentional bias to 
illness cues contributes to hypochondriacal concern in individuals 
who do not have a serious illness, did not resolve the issue of 
whether or not the effect is more important than that of attentional 
bias to socially threatening stimuli. To test this, a final stepwise 
regression was performed with the data from the 110 non-sick subjects 
using CES-D scores, WSI-Impact scores, and weighted difference scores 
for both the illness and social reaction times (in which their shared 
variance with baseline neutral reaction time was removed) as 
predictors. The CES-D scores stepped in first and predicted 
approximately 16% of the variance in IAS scores [F(1,108)=20.25, p < 
.0001]. The attentional bias weighted difference score for social 
reaction times stepped in and accounted for 3% incremental variance 
[F(2,107 )=4.45, p < .05] - Although the WSI-Impact scores were 
entered in the third step [F(3,106)=2.16, p < .15], it was later 
removed from the model. The weighted difference score for illness 
reaction times did not meet the .I 5 criterion for entry into the 
model. Although the second path analysis suggested that illness RTs,
when not in competition with social RTs, will predict a significant 
amount of variance in hypochondriacal concern in non-sick subjects, 
the social RTs continued to account for relatively more variance in 
hypochondriacal concern than the illness RTs when both variables were 
included in the same regression.
DISCUSSION
The present study was designed to investigate attentional bias 
to illness-related stimuli, as inferred from the reaction times in 
the presence of illness distractors on the attentional search task, 
and inflation of subjective risk for future negative health events, 
as measured probability judgments, in hypochondriacal concern.
Theory and clinical lore suggest that attentional bias to illness- 
related stimuli and increased subjective risk for future negative 
health events are etiologically related to hypochondriacal concern. 
The results, however, generally failed to support the hypotheses that 
illness-specific cognitive distortions would predict hypochondriacal 
concern in this sample of medical outpatients.
Summary of Attentional Bias Analyses
The results of the stepwise regression with the attentional bias 
RTs failed to confirm the specificity hypothesis that attentional 
bias to illness stimuli would predict a significant amount of 
variance in hypochondriacal concern, either as a main effect or in 
interaction with depressed mood. It should not be assumed, however, 
that the attentional bias task itself was insensitive with this 
sample of subjects, given the findings with the socially threatening 
words. The trimming procedure apparently decreased within subject 
variance in the RTs and enabled the social threat RTs to meet 
criterion for entry into the model.
The failure to find attentional bias to illness cues was 
surprising. Recent research has suggested that attentional bias to 
threatening stimuli is specific to an individual's clinical concerns.
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This specificity to threat has been demonstrated, for example, in 
social phobics with socially-threatening words (Hope et al., 1990), 
and PTSD-disordered war veterans with combat-related words (McNally 
et al., 1990). Therefore, it was hypothesized that hypochondriacal 
concern would be associated with attentional bias to illness words, 
as opposed to socially-threatening words. Results of the stepwise 
regression with all subjects, however, indicated that attentional 
bias to socially threatening words predicted more variance in 
hypochondriacal concern. Once sick subjects were removed from the 
sample, a path analysis supported the hypothesis that attentional 
bias to illness cues does have a causal impact on hypochondriacal 
concern. A final stepwise regression, however, indicated that RTs to 
illness words still accounted for less variance in IAS scores than 
RTs to social threat words.
Failure to find a specific attentional bias to illness cues 
might have been caused by a lack of subjects with DSM-III-R 
hypochondriasis. In a recently published review of attentional bias 
research, Logan and Goetsch (1993) concluded that the specificity 
effect tended to be found only in DSM-III-R diagnostic groups, while 
analogue or subclinical groups displayed attentional bias to general 
threat. For example, in the surveyed 14 studies employing anxiety- 
disordered subjects that attempted to determine whether attentional 
bias was to specific or general threat cues, 1 I found attentional 
bias to specific, personally relevant threat cues. Studies with 
nonclinical subjects with high trait anxiety, however, typically have 
found greater attentional bias toward general than specific threats.
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While it was hoped that the fairly large sample of medical 
patients would include some individuals whose hypochondriacal concern 
was in the clinical range, limited resources did not permit subjects 
to be diagnosed psychiatrically. Even for those subjects with high 
IAS scores and low physician ratings, it cannot be assumed that they 
met the criteria for the DSM-III-R diagnosis of hypochondriasis. At 
best, they can only be viewed as lying in the upper range of the 
continuum of subclinical hypochondriacal concern. The final path 
analysis and stepwise regression with non-sick subjects indicated 
that attentional bias to illness and social cues both contributed to 
hypochondriacal concern. This suggests that a general sensitivity to 
all threatening stimuli, rather than illness cues alone, was linked 
to subclinical levels of hypochondriacal concern in this sample, 
consistent with the findings of the Logan and Goetsch review.
The consistent superiority of the RTs to social threat words 
over RTs to illness words in predicting hypochondriacal concern, 
however, remains puzzling. The intriguing findings might indicate 
that social distress plays a contributing role in abnormal illness 
concerns, consistent with speculations that hypochondriacs express 
emotional problems in somatic terms. Such conjectures, however, are 
purely post hoc and tempered by the fact that the social threat RTs 
only accounted for 3% of the variance in IAS scores. A more 
parsimonious explanation is that subjects with extremely high levels 
of hypochondriacal concern also had significant social concerns.
The sociodemographics of the sample suggest that the study 
participants faced enormous social and economic stressors. Research
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indicates that psychopathology is prevalent among patients attending 
low-income, inner-city medical clinics (e.g., Miranda & Dwyer, 1993). 
As many as 65% of the medical outpatients at the hospital where this 
study was conducted, for example, meet criteria for at least one DSM- 
III-R diagnosis (Adams, 1993). Indeed, the average CES-D scores 
(19.67) and WSI scores (Event - 29.95, Impact - 92.95) of the present 
sample indicates moderate to severe levels of depression and stress. 
It is conceivable that the ability of the social threat RTs to 
predict hypochondriacal concern may have resulted from comorbid 
anxiety or depression related to social distress.
Another possible explanation for the failure to find illness- 
specific cognitive distortions is that the hospital environment used 
to locate subjects may have unintentionally biased the results.
Given that the subjects were tested in a medical setting while 
awaiting a medical appointment, it may be that the experimental 
conditions primed illness concepts among all subjects, thus erasing 
any pre-existing differential sensitivity to illness cues that might 
have existed among them. It seems reasonable to propose that 
different results may have been obtained in a neutral setting. 
Therefore, the present failure to find evidence of a specific 
attentional bias to illness cues must be regarded as inconclusive. 
Summary of Subjective Risk Analyses
Although the subjective risk estimates for future health events 
and its interaction with depression in predicting hypochondriacal 
concern were significant, together they only accounted for a modest 
6% of the variance in hypochondriacal concern. Furthermore, the
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regression was in the opposite direction from that which was 
hypothesized in that subjects apparently rated future positive health 
events as more likely to occur than future negative health events as 
their level of hypochondriacal concern increased. The significance 
of the interaction term, however, suggested that an important 
conditional relation existed in the data. When groups differing in 
level of depression were compared, the trend for positive health 
events to be rated as more likely to occur than negative health 
events as hypochondriacal concern increased was only found among 
nondepressed subjects. Subjective risk scores for future health 
events did not predict any appreciable amount of variance among 
subjects who were depressed.
The originally proposed stepwise regression failed to support 
the hypotheses that hypochondriacal concern would be associated with 
an inflation of perceived risk for future negative health events, and 
that the relation would be magnified among depressed individuals. It 
appears, however, that the use of linear regression analysis obscured 
the complex interactions among subjects with extreme levels of 
hypochondriacal concern. Depressed mood did apparently interact in a 
unique way with abnormal illness concerns when individuals scoring in 
the upper ranges of hypochondriacal concern contemplated the future. 
An unplanned, post hoc ANOVA indicated that hypochondriacal subjects 
did rate future negative health events as relatively more likely to 
occur when depressed, but sick and normal subjects who were depressed 
rated future positive health events as more likely to occur. The 
opposing trends were cancelled out in the regression. This suggests
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that different results may be obtained in future investigations 
employing extreme groups. As in studies of attentional bias, all 
previously documented investigations of subjective risk have examined 
mean differences between groups (either between extreme scorers or 
between clinical patients and normals). It may be that the proposed 
cognitive biases of hypochondriasis involve qualitative differences, 
rather than quantitative differences which occur on a continuum.
The finding that positive health events were rated as more 
likely to occur as levels of hypochondriacal concern increased among 
the sample was unexpected and suggests the operation of an 
additional, unknown moderator variable. For example, the optimism of 
these subjects might reflect a defensive reporting bias resulting 
from social desirability. The complex interaction between depression 
and hypochondriacal concern in subjects' ratings of future health 
events also may have been due to a related, but somewhat different 
variable. Research (e.g., Davis & Schwartz, 1987) suggests that 
"repressors" (i.e., low anxious/high social desirability) inhibit the 
expression of negative emotional experiences because of an 
inaccessibility of affective memories. If availability does play a 
role in subjective risk, then repression may inhibit probability 
judgments of future negative events. Speculation such as this, of 
course, needs to be pursued in further research.
The failure to find support for the proposed attentional and 
subjective risk biases may also be attributed to the sociodemographic 
characteristics of the subjects. The sample for the present study 
was apparently very different in terms of their sociodemographic
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make-up from the samples of college students and clinic patients 
which have been used in most previous studies of cognitive 
distortions. Although the present results might be dismissed as 
coming from an unrepresentative sample of medical patients in the 
United States, studies which employ low SES and minority populations 
are under-represented in the scientific literature. Further 
investigations of will be needed to determine whether the proposed 
cognitive biases of hypochondriasis are generalizable to minority and 
low-income samples.
It is entirely possible, for example, that the casual path to 
hypochondriacal concern might be very different among the 
economically and educationally deprived patients who participated in 
this study. Subclinical levels of hypochondriacal concern might be 
reinforced in low SES patients if medical settings offer a 
sympathetic forum for expressing and obtaining assistance for social 
and financial problems. Indeed, previous studies which have 
questioned the validity of hypochondriasis as a discrete diagnostic 
entity may have included a majority of subjects with comorbid 
depression or anxiety related to socioeconomic problems. Individuals 
such as these may be more likely to exhibit cognitive biases to 
social, or generally threatening stimuli. In contrast, DSM-III-R 
diagnosed hypochondriacs, who exhibit the classic features of 
irrational beliefs about illness, disease phobia, reassurance 
seeking, and doctor-shopping, may be more likely to exhibit illness- 
specific cognitive distortions.
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Illness-specific cognitive distortions have been proposed to be 
etiologically related to hypochondriacal concern. Even if 
attentional bias to illness cues and inflation of subjective risk for 
future negative health events are eventually identified in DSM-III-R 
diagnosed hypochondriacs, the question of whether they are a cause or 
result of the disorder will remain. Given the results of the Logan 
and Goetsch review (1993), it may be that attentional bias to general 
threatening stimuli acts as a predisposing factor for hypochondriasis 
and the various anxiety disorders, but that threat-specific cognitive 
distortions develop as a result of psychopathology. It may take 
longitudinal research with subjects at risk for hypochondriasis to 
resolve this issue definitively. Regardless of how the cognitive 
biases may arise, however, it seems likely that they would operate as 
important maintaining factors through a circular relationship.
This project involved the first attempt to establish empirical 
evidence of a relationship between attentional bias and subjective 
risk. As noted previously, availability mediated by an association 
network has been postulated as an underlying mechanism for both 
selective allocation of attentional resources and judgments of 
subjective risk (e.g., Bower, 1981). The availability heuristic 
refers to the ease with which examples of events can be remembered or 
imagined. It was assumed that if attention is repeatedly drawn to 
information relevant to illness, then the availability of that 
information in memory will be enhanced, and the perceived risk of 
becoming ill will be increased. The results, however, failed to 
demonstrate an association between attentional bias to threatening
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stimuli and judgments of subjective risk. This suggests that the two 
cognitive biases may operate independently of each other.
The lack of association also calls into question the concept of 
availability as an underlying factor for both attentional bias and 
subjective risk. McNally and his associates (1990) have proposed 
that availability is an insufficient explanation for attentional 
bias. They suggest that anxiety-disordered patients may instead have 
more difficulty deactivating threat concepts once they have been 
accessed. MacLeod and Mathews (1991) have also recently questioned 
the idea that availability is the important mediating factor for 
attentional bias and suggest that the phenomenon might be better 
explained by the differential assignment in the priority assigned to 
the processing of simultaneously available stimulus inputs.
Although the present study failed to support the hypothesis that 
individuals with hypochondriacal concern have specific cognitive 
biases toward illness cues, further investigations of attentional 
bias and subjective risk in hypochondriacal concern appear warranted. 
Future research, however, should employ subjects who explicitly meet 
the criteria for the DSM-III-R diagnosis of hypochondriasis compared 
to normals as well as individuals with subclinical levels of 
hypochondriacal concern. The magnitude of subjects' social concerns 
should be assessed and matched across groups so that any differential 
responses to social threat cues on information processing tasks can 
be placed in perspective. Perhaps most importantly, subjects should 
be tested in a neutral setting so that specific fears are not 
differentially activated.
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Although cognitive theories of psychopathology have become very 
popular in the past decade, many have employed "lay" concepts of 
cognition (Teasdale, 1993). For example, if information processing 
concepts such as schemas and attentional bias are used to explain 
psychopathology, it is important to determine whether the proposed 
concepts represent the same phenomena as those studied by basic 
cognitive science. Otherwise, the theoretical integrity of cognitive 
clinical psychology could be compromised. By testing the 
hypothesized cognitive distortions with empirical methods derived 
from basic cognitive science, we can discover whether cognitive 
theories of psychopathology are valid or serve merely as "post hoc 
rationalizations when ad hoc clinical procedures seem to have worked" 
(Ross, 1991 cf Teasdale, 1993).
Paradigms borrowed from basic cognitive science may also yield 
benefits for clinical practice. The information processing tasks 
themselves may represent the crude beginnings of useful diagnostic 
techniques. In the near future, they may take their place alongside 
patient self-report, behavioral observation, and psychophysiological 
recordings in the multi-modal assessment of certain psychological 
disorders. Cognitive psychologists are also investigating strategies 
to debias specific cognitive distortions such as unrealistic 
subjective risk estimates in normals (e.g., Arkes, 1991). These may 
ultimately prove to be useful therapeutic strategies for 
psychologically-disordered patients. As cognitive factors are 
increasingly recognized as important factors in psychopathology,
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research derived from basic cognitive science may help to advance the 
understanding and treatment of psychological disorders.
Conclusions
The present study of cognitive distortions among medical 
outpatients failed to provide support for theories which suggest 
that attentional bias to illness cues and inflation of subjective 
risk for future negative health events are associated with 
hypochondriacal concern. Several factors which may have contributed 
to the negative findings, such as a lack of subjects clearly meeting 
criteria for the DSM-III-R diagnosis for hypochondriais, were 
identified. Because the cognitive distortions appeared to operate 
across subjects in a discontinuous, nonlinear fashion, future 
analyses of the present data set employing statistical techniques 
such as analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) or repeated measures multiple 
analysis of variance (MANOVA), and discriminant function analysis may 
yet reveal useful information. Further research, however, 
investigating illness-specific cognitive distortions with information 
processing paradigms conparing DSM-III-R diagnosed hypochondriacs to 
individuals with subclinical levels of hypochondriacal concern and 
normals, appears warranted.
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DEMOGRAPHIC AND MEDICAL STATUS QUESTIONNAIRE 
Age__________
Sex: M F
Race: Black White Other
Marital Status: Single  Married____
Highest Level of Education Completed: Annual Income of Household:
some high school 70,000+
high school graduate 60,000 - 70,000
some college/university 50,000 - 60,000
college/university graduate 40,000 - 50,000




How long have you been a patient at this clinic?
What is the reason for your appointment today? (check one)
 Problem with a long-standing illness (e.g., diabetes)
 Problem with a recent illness (e.g., flu)
 Routine Health Maintenance (e.g., physical exams for employment,
immunizations, contraception, routine pap smears, pregnancy 
tests)
Has a physician ever diagnosed you with a really serious illness that 
could threaten your life?  no  yes






Physician:______________________  Subject Number:__________
EKL#:_______________
What was the reason for this patient's clinic visit today?
______ Chronic Diagnostic Problem (e.g., Hypertension, Asthma)
______ Acute Diagnostic Problem (e.g., Urinary Tract Infection)
______ Undiagnosed Complaint or Symptom (e.g., Back Pain)
______ Routine Health Maintenance (e.g., physical exams for
employment, immunizations, contraception, routine pap smears, 
pregnancy tests)
Please rate the patient's global health status using the following 
scale by circling the number which best describes the patient's 
overall physical health FOR THE PAST 12 MONTHS:
0 - patient is in good physical health with a history of only
routine minor illnesses
1 - patient is largely free of serious medical problems but presents
with numerous undiagnosed symptoms and complaints
2 - patient is largely free of serious medical problems but has one
or more risk factors (e.g., smoking) which places him/her at
risk for the development of future illness
3 - patient has a history of serious disease which is currently in
remission - patient appears in good health and is compliant with
medical recommendations 
OR
patient has a chronic-degenerative disease (e.g., diabetes) 
which is well-controlled and patient is compliant with medical 
recommendations
4 - patient has a history of serious disease which is currently in
remission - but patient is noncompliant, engages in health risk
behaviors, or has additional aggravating illnesses
5 - patient currently has one or more chronic-degenerative
disease(s) which is poorly controlled resulting in an increased 
probability of morbidity






DIRECTTONS: Below are a number of events which could possibly occur
to you sometime in the future. For each event, please estimate the 
likelihood that the situation could occur to you by using the scale 
at the top of each page to rate the event on a scale from 0 to 8. 
Record your response by placing a number in the blank next to the 
item. This number should reflect your opinion on how likely you 
believe the event will happen to you. Before answering any question, 
please review the scale.
0 1  2 3  4 5  6 7  8
Almost A Little Moderately Very Almost
Impossible Likely Likely Likely Certain
1. What is the probability that you will be happily married in 
5 years? ______
2. What is the probability that you will be short on cash 
and be unable to pay one of your electricity bills on time 
next year?
3. What is the probability that you will be physically active 
in 20 years?
4. What is the probability that you will be lonely in your 
old age?
5. What is the probability that someone will give you money 
for your birthday next year?
6. What is the probability that you wall die of a heart 
attack?
7. What is the probability that you will make any new friends 
this year?
8. What is the probability that you will lose your wallet in 
the next 20 years?
9. What is the probability that you will feel in peak physical 
condition this year?
10. What is the probability that you will not be on speaking 
terms with a member of your family in the next ten years?
11. What is the probability that you will win the Louisiana 
lottery in the next five years?
12. What is the probability that you will develop pneumonia in 
the next five years?
13. What is the probability that you will be praised in the 
newspaper in the next 20 years?
14. What is the probability that the IRS will audit your 
income tax returns in your lifetime?
15. What is the probability that your doctor will give you a 
clean bill of health in 15 years?
16. What is the probability that you will be rejected by your 
best friend next year?
17. What is the probability that your income will increase in 
the next 5 years?
18. What is the probability that you will ever contract AIDS?
19. What is the probability your friends and family will value 
your opinion and seek your advice in 20 years?
20. What is the probability that you will be successfully sued 
in the next 10 years?
21. What is the probability that you will live to be 100?
22. What is the probability that you will be divorced in 20 
years?
23. What is the probability that you will ever find $100 on 
the street?
24. What is the probability that you will have to cut back 
on activities in the next five years because of poor health?
25. What is the probability that you will receive a "citizen 
of the month" award sometime in your life?
26. What is the probability that you will have to file for 
bankruptcy in the next 20 years?
27. What is the probability that you would not become sick 
if you were exposed to the flu next year?
28. What is the probability that a friend will criticize 
you in the next 5 years?
29. What is the probability that you will be debt-free in 
15 years?
30. What is the probability that you will develop cancer 
within the next 20 years?
APPENDIX D
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101
102
DISTRACTOR WORDS USED FOR ATTENTIONAL BIAS TASK BY CATEGORY
H I M S S  SOCIAL NEUTRAL POSITIVE
AIDS LOSER HANGER JACKPOT
CARDIAC IDIOT QUILT CAVIAR
COMA JEALOUS BROOM LOTTERY
RASH COWARD SKILLET RUBY
ALLERGY SNEER BATHTUB TUXEDO
NAUSEA TIMID NAPKIN CASINO
VOMIT CLUMSY SPOON JEWEL
SNEEZE DISGUST OVEN VELVET
SPASM DECEIVE CHIMNEY LIMO
GERM OFFEND HAMMER MINK
CRAMP TEASE SPONGE SATIN
INFECT ANNOY BUCKET FEAST
DIZZY ENVY PILLOW CRUISE
ULCER INSULT STEREO BANQUET
SEIZURE PUNISH DRAWER EMERALD
SURGERY MOCK ATTIC PEARL
ITCH FOOLISH TOWEL YACHT
COUGH GOSSIP STOVE LACE
DEAF RUMOR BASKET CASTLE
CRIPPLE ASHAMED CLOSET MANSION
SORE UGLY CARPET PERFUME
VIRUS FROWN SHELF SILK
ACHE STUPID CURTAIN DIAMOND
BLEED LONELY CABINET FURS
POISON GUILTY LAMP IVORY
FEVER ABUSE FORK RESORT
CHOKE DISLIKE CLOCK INHERIT
ILLNESS BORED MIRROR WEALTH
CANCER CURSE DISHES LUXURY
FAINT DIVORCE PENCIL LEATHER
TUMOR BLAME BLANKET FORTUNE
STROKE ACCUSE BENCH SILVER
INJURY ANGRY PLATE CRYSTAL
HURT AFRAID CAMERA CASH
SICK IGNORE STAIR GOLD
BLIND HATE PHONE ESTATE
DISEASE ARGUE ROOF RICH
PAIN FIRED DESK BANK
OPERATE AVOID CHAIR DOLLARS






PERFORMANCE SITES: Subjects for this study will be obtained from the
Family Practice Clinic at the Louisiana State University Medical 
Center in Baton Rouge at Earl K. Long Medical Center.
For 24-hour access, please contact 358-1105
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY:
A. This project is a research study.
B. Individuals who agree to participate as research subjects in this 
project will not be treated in any way that is different from other 
patients at this clinic, other than completing the questionnaires and 
experimental task described below (see #7). Participation in this 
project as a research subject will not in any way affect or otherwise 
alter medical care received at this clinic.
C. This study is designed to investigate how health status, 
attitudes toward health, mood, and stress influence thinking and use 
of health care resources in family practice patients.
SUBJECT INCLUSION CRITERIA: Individuals are eligible to participate
in the study if they are: between 21 and 65 years of age and if they 
have been patients at the Family Practice Clinic for at least one 
year.
SUBJECT EXCLUSION CRITERIA: Individuals will not be eligible to
participate in the study if they currently have a terminal illness 
(e.g., cancer). Individuals will also be excluded from participation 
if they are unable to read for any reason (e.g., illiterate or 
because of poor eyesight or because reading glasses were left at 
home). Individuals may participate only once in this project.
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY: Volunteers will be recruited from patients
visiting the Family Practice Clinic. Subjects will complete the 
study while waiting for their regularly scheduled clinic 
appointments. After giving informed consent, eligible subjects will 
be asked to conplete a packet containing a demographic questionnaire 
and measures of: attitudes toward health, health status, daily
stress, mood, and estimates of future events. In addition, each 
subject's Family Practice physician, and another physician who will 
review each subject's medical chart, will provide the experimenter 
with health status ratings. Information will also be obtained about 
the frequency of clinic attendance. Neither physician, however, will 
have knowledge of the subjects' questionnaire responses.
After completing the questionnaires, each subject will be asked to 
participate in a computer task assessing the extent to which 
attention is captured by certain topics. Subjects should be able to 
conplete the study in approximately 45 minutes. About 200 patients 
will participate in the study.
BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS: Potential benefits which may result from this
research include: information leading to better understanding of 
factors related to the use of health care resources and improved
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methods for helping patients learn to cope with these factors. 
Subjects actually participating in the study, however, will receive 
no direct benefits.
RISKS TO SUBJECTS: There are no known major physical, psychological,
and/or social risks or discomforts that might occur to subjects as a 
result of this study. Participation in this study, however, may 
involve unforseen risks. Lesser risks can be explained if subjects 
ask for this information. If subjects wish, the experimenter can 
provide a referral for additional assistance. Patients should not 
expect their medical condition to improve with participation in this 
study.
ALTERNATIVES TO PARTICIPATION IN THE STUDY: Participation is
voluntary. Patients who do not participate will attend their clinic 
appointments as usual.
SUBJECT REMOVAL: There are no forseeable circumstances under which
eligible subjects would be removed from the study against their 
wishes. Subjects will be forced to withdraw only if they become 
physically unable (e.g., due to sudden illness) to complete the 
experimental tasks described above.
SUBJECTS' RIGHT TO REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE OR WITHDRAW: Study subjects
may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time 
without jeopardizing, in any way, their medical treatment at this 
institution in the present or future. Should significant new 
findings develop during the course of the research which may relate 
to the subject's willingness to continue participation, that 
information will be provided to the subject.
SUBJECTS' RIGHT TO PRIVACY: The results of the study may be released
to the funding agency. The results of the study may also be 
published. The privacy of subjects, however, will be protected and 
they will not be identified in any way.
RELEASE OF INFORMATION: The medical records related to the study are
available to the sponsoring agency. By agreeing to participate in 
this research study and by signing this consent form, the subject a.) 
gives permission for his/her Family Practice physician to release 
health status ratings to the experimenter, and b.) gives permission 
for another physician to review the subject's medical chart and 
provide similar information on health status and frequency of clinic 
visits to the experimenter.
FINANCIAL INFORMATION:
A. Participation in this study will not result in any extra charges 
above and beyond those routinely incurred by patients with similar 
illnesses.
B. The costs of study-related and unforeseen complications must be 
met by subjects.
106
C. Subjects who conplete the study will be paid $5.00 for their 
participation. If subjects choose to withdraw from the study 
prematurely, they will be partially compensated with an amount based 
upon percent of time completed, not to exceed $2.00.
SIGNATURES: The study has been discussed with me and all my
questions have been answered. I agree with the terms above
and acknowledge that I have been given a copy of the consent form.
Signature of Subject Date
Signature of Witness Date
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